Existence is that which closes off possibilities. It exists because existence is itself.
But the existence of an existence cannot be given within existence itself: it must be given through a set of criteria which defines the terms of existence, and the conditions of existence.
The terms of existence define that which may be said to exist, while the conditions of existence defines that which exists.
Existence is the concretization of the conditions of existence in relation to the terms of existence.
In being that concretization, it identifies (or gives content to) the conditions of existence.
But in order to do so, existence is necessarily in the state of existing to which the concretization refers.
But, in being both the concretized condition of existence, as well as the state of existing, existence relates itself to itself.
Therefore existence is paradox and duality: condition and existence. It is infinite duality.
In other words, when we speak of existence, we refer to the possibility of the conceptualization of the actuality, as well as the actuality through which the possibility of the conceptualization is made meaningful. We have no other examples. But even if we had, we would not call it existence.
So an applied conception of existence creates dualities, depending on the role which the concept performs.
Hence we get absurdities: idealism and materialism are both sides of the same coin, so to speak.
This is the problem engendered in Hegel's quote: All identification is self-identity.
More: all manifested ideas are identified, hence all manifested ideas are self-identifying.
In this sense, duality comes about through the identification process of a concept.
***
We could have many universes. Each universe would be a fact referring itself to itself, as a minimum condition.
The world is fundamentally unity, as a necessary condition of its existence, its referring of itself to itself.
Existence is relative when applied, but absolute in conception.
A possible solution to the brain in a vat.
Facts are referred to other facts. A universe of facts is the world of inter-referring facts.
Existence is the act of something referring itself to itself.
It refers the terms of its own existence to the state of its being.
The state of its being is constitutively self-referring.
Thursday, May 07, 2015
Tuesday, March 24, 2015
Thursday, February 12, 2015
Repeat
To repeat oneself:
Existence is self-definition. Hence, to exist, one must define oneself in relation to oneself.
Existence is self-definition. Hence, to exist, one must define oneself in relation to oneself.
Tuesday, December 16, 2014
Spirit 1
Spirit is by nature self-interpretation in its own process of unfolding.
Existence is the act of something referring itself to itself.
Because it embodies itself through its interpretation of itself, it becomes inevitable through that unfolding, because the idea itself, in embodying itself, is conditioned by that interpretation.
Existence is the act of something referring itself to itself.
Because it embodies itself through its interpretation of itself, it becomes inevitable through that unfolding, because the idea itself, in embodying itself, is conditioned by that interpretation.
Saturday, November 15, 2014
An important post
On value investing:
A stock tends towards it's attractor state, which is it's intrinsic value. Price is an illusion.
So likewise life tends towards it's attractor state, which are the ideas contained in it's being. The march of events, or history, is an illusion.
On governance:
Governance is a kind of model to deal with the problem of the orderly and stable distribution of authority over a territory, within a system of States, and wider economic systems. Things like social compacts and forms of contracting are endogenized within the model of governance. These models are very unique to each country.
The change of models happen once in a very long time, and real revolutions are very rare. Most so called revolutions preserve the same model of governance within new institutions.
Every state, through it's existing model of governance, implies the form of violence it can accommodate, before the coordinates of society itself breaks down. Failed states, perhaps, are the only seeds of new models of governance.
On jobs:
What is your ideal job? Its the job which has you as you are as it's ideal.
On art:
Art without spirituality is like science without mathematics. Hence modern art is a waste of time. In music, modern refers to anything after the Baroque era.
A stock tends towards it's attractor state, which is it's intrinsic value. Price is an illusion.
So likewise life tends towards it's attractor state, which are the ideas contained in it's being. The march of events, or history, is an illusion.
On governance:
Governance is a kind of model to deal with the problem of the orderly and stable distribution of authority over a territory, within a system of States, and wider economic systems. Things like social compacts and forms of contracting are endogenized within the model of governance. These models are very unique to each country.
The change of models happen once in a very long time, and real revolutions are very rare. Most so called revolutions preserve the same model of governance within new institutions.
Every state, through it's existing model of governance, implies the form of violence it can accommodate, before the coordinates of society itself breaks down. Failed states, perhaps, are the only seeds of new models of governance.
On jobs:
What is your ideal job? Its the job which has you as you are as it's ideal.
On art:
Art without spirituality is like science without mathematics. Hence modern art is a waste of time. In music, modern refers to anything after the Baroque era.
Monday, October 27, 2014
Fate
1) Irony
The knowledge of fate allows you to take responsibility in actualizing it.
My lack of freedom to determine my destiny gives rise to the responsibility to bring it about. The freedom to self-determine the specifics of the destiny gives rise to the responsibility.
Freedom is exercised through choice, and choice is the result of the interactions of the conditions which limit our freedom with those that allow it.
2) Persons
Persons are the unfolding of ideas in the world. People are just embodiments of ideas that are unfolding in the world of ideas.
The world is just the artifact of ideas, interacting with the progression of ideas.
The world of things are just historical artefacts of the things that are thought and brought into existence by persons, who become themselves as ideas through the chanelling process.
It is the receptacle of the potentiality of ideas, as the residual of that process of incorporation.
Becoming what one is = Embodying the idea that one is
The world supports this process of embodiment because it is itself idea; and the process of that embodiment is itself idea.
The phenomenology of idea-unfolding is just the historical world itself, that is, agency is the relation of the active idea to the systemic totality of ideas.
Problem: Defoundationalization of the systemic totality. How do we reconceptualize it, and therefore our relations to it?
Eg. I will not be an asset manager because I do not embody the idea of one. But I will be a philosopher because I am the idea of philosophy in person; I am philosophy itself.
The primary function of man is to embody the idea that they are in the world.
In so doing, they create their own religion.
In this sense, there are two types of persons: those who create their own religion, and those who follow the creations of others. Other distinctions are irrelevant.
The knowledge of fate allows you to take responsibility in actualizing it.
My lack of freedom to determine my destiny gives rise to the responsibility to bring it about. The freedom to self-determine the specifics of the destiny gives rise to the responsibility.
Freedom is exercised through choice, and choice is the result of the interactions of the conditions which limit our freedom with those that allow it.
2) Persons
Persons are the unfolding of ideas in the world. People are just embodiments of ideas that are unfolding in the world of ideas.
The world is just the artifact of ideas, interacting with the progression of ideas.
The world of things are just historical artefacts of the things that are thought and brought into existence by persons, who become themselves as ideas through the chanelling process.
It is the receptacle of the potentiality of ideas, as the residual of that process of incorporation.
Becoming what one is = Embodying the idea that one is
The world supports this process of embodiment because it is itself idea; and the process of that embodiment is itself idea.
The phenomenology of idea-unfolding is just the historical world itself, that is, agency is the relation of the active idea to the systemic totality of ideas.
Problem: Defoundationalization of the systemic totality. How do we reconceptualize it, and therefore our relations to it?
Eg. I will not be an asset manager because I do not embody the idea of one. But I will be a philosopher because I am the idea of philosophy in person; I am philosophy itself.
The primary function of man is to embody the idea that they are in the world.
In so doing, they create their own religion.
In this sense, there are two types of persons: those who create their own religion, and those who follow the creations of others. Other distinctions are irrelevant.
Self-Advice 1
1) The optimal strategy to deal with the factor of randomness in life:
Curb your greed and learn to be opportunistic.
Greed is the desire and action to grab that which is not given to you by the universe.
Opportunism is the ability to seize the windows of opportunity for gain that are periodically handed to you.
One must learn to tell the difference between an act of opportunity and an act of greed or folly.
To do that, one must know enough (ie, know what you are doing), and be enough (ie, to know oneself).
2) On asymmetric volatility:
In a bull market, greed is more reliable than fear: buy calls.
In a bear market, fear is more reliable than greed: buy puts.
Curb your greed and learn to be opportunistic.
Greed is the desire and action to grab that which is not given to you by the universe.
Opportunism is the ability to seize the windows of opportunity for gain that are periodically handed to you.
One must learn to tell the difference between an act of opportunity and an act of greed or folly.
To do that, one must know enough (ie, know what you are doing), and be enough (ie, to know oneself).
2) On asymmetric volatility:
In a bull market, greed is more reliable than fear: buy calls.
In a bear market, fear is more reliable than greed: buy puts.
Thursday, July 03, 2014
Pragmatic Thought (Chain 1)
Evolution of Forms vs Development of Forms.
The mutually conditioning nature is exemplified by ideal science (empirics and ideas).
Use is itself an evolved use of prior use.
+
Successive evolution of 'terms of use'.
These parameterize the conditions in which future things are made useful.
A dynamic process, whereby the conditions in which knowledge is developed and applied is 'brought along' in the specific terms in which it has been developed (to the exclusion of other possible paths) through successive 'use of use' (recursivity).
(Statements about things, identified in a verbal way follows this general pattern).
The parameters are useful because they are useful, but they are useful because they have created the conditions in which the things which are useful are useful (within those parameters), have themselves created/affected the conditions in which the usefulness of the parameters are made useful. (retroactivity)
This retroactive mutual conditioning of usefulness is the starting point of dynamic stability, which is necessary for the reproduction of things in time.
Of course, there is necessarily (at least) a third criterion, to which the usefulness of the parameter is referenced.
But the the forward movement of time itself, ie, forward movement itself, is the product of usefulness. The retroactivity of certain underlying conditions gave rise to the usefulness of this forward movement.
What are these conditions? (and what are their use?)
The mutually conditioning nature is exemplified by ideal science (empirics and ideas).
Use is itself an evolved use of prior use.
+
Successive evolution of 'terms of use'.
These parameterize the conditions in which future things are made useful.
A dynamic process, whereby the conditions in which knowledge is developed and applied is 'brought along' in the specific terms in which it has been developed (to the exclusion of other possible paths) through successive 'use of use' (recursivity).
(Statements about things, identified in a verbal way follows this general pattern).
The parameters are useful because they are useful, but they are useful because they have created the conditions in which the things which are useful are useful (within those parameters), have themselves created/affected the conditions in which the usefulness of the parameters are made useful. (retroactivity)
This retroactive mutual conditioning of usefulness is the starting point of dynamic stability, which is necessary for the reproduction of things in time.
Of course, there is necessarily (at least) a third criterion, to which the usefulness of the parameter is referenced.
But the the forward movement of time itself, ie, forward movement itself, is the product of usefulness. The retroactivity of certain underlying conditions gave rise to the usefulness of this forward movement.
What are these conditions? (and what are their use?)
Friday, May 17, 2013
Quotes 9
"The argument, in short, is that in a world of uncertainty, where probabilistic calculus is ruled out, rules, norms and institutions play a functional role in providing a basis for decision-making, expectation, and belief. Without these 'rigidities', without social routine and habit to reproduce them, and without institutionally conditioned conceptual frameworks, an uncertain world would present a chaos of sense data in which it would be impossible for the agent to make sensible decisions and act". Hodgson (1988:205)
Thursday, April 04, 2013
Hello World 1
To be the world, to which the subject, which is now the object, is being put.
To be is subjective, not objective.
Paradoxically, only by subjectivising being in the world can the subject be objectivised.
To be is subjective, not objective.
Paradoxically, only by subjectivising being in the world can the subject be objectivised.
Sunday, February 10, 2013
Thought Mind 1
The mind processes across commonly used circuits.
Some circuits are more easily accessed than others.
The depth of the circuit defines the way content is processed.
The several circuits are not independent.
Activating these circuits require resetting the chain of electrical movement.
The best circuits allow for resets while retaining working memory.
This involves having developed thought forms that combine several circuits, exploiting principled similarities.
In this sense, the content is important.
How the content is perceived enables the circuitry to come into motion.
Some circuits are more easily accessed than others.
The depth of the circuit defines the way content is processed.
The several circuits are not independent.
Activating these circuits require resetting the chain of electrical movement.
The best circuits allow for resets while retaining working memory.
This involves having developed thought forms that combine several circuits, exploiting principled similarities.
In this sense, the content is important.
How the content is perceived enables the circuitry to come into motion.
Saturday, January 19, 2013
Shared Environments
All collectively functioning social environments work along an operationally handy, and definitive, set of mental-constructs (eg, values, associative perspectives, ideas of relations between things), which hides the underlying absurdity (psychologically-speaking), and keeps it going. That is, it is the means by which it identifies itself as existing - an operationalizing principle that directs its efforts in a cogent and coordinated way. (That is the necessity of philosophy & ethics, to units in a social system). It defines action as (necessarily, presuming reflexivity & teleology) reaction, and reaction as progress, according to metaphysical and epistemic ideals.
Underlying cause-effect conditions serve as common convergences of values, but the terms by which they are endogenously interpreted by these perspectives are non-systematic - by virtue of the subject/object gap. Because this systemic complexity, they are more arbitrary, even idealistic-chaotic (ie, animal spirits), than the presence of institutions seem to suggest - for they direct them, not the other way round. Because values are themselves changing, and difficult to profile collectively, the role of information constraints are much less binding, than in systems of exchange of information with well-defined ends.
The point to note is that these definitions of (social science) real are wildly inaccurate depictions of reality, which is dynamic and indefinable. (Think of it as a consciousness.) They are used because they 1) create statistically modellable coherences of references to so-called reality along the broadest distinctions, made possible by sample sizes, and testable, 2) allow sub-units of a social system to cohere, but many important causal facts are themselves determined not through an individualist perspective, which is endogenous within the system (and therefore determines its coherence, and the well-working of parts) but collectively, as a system, or as layers of quickly forming and dissoluting systems, in reaction to external causes upon the system, one of which is individuality itself.
Underlying cause-effect conditions serve as common convergences of values, but the terms by which they are endogenously interpreted by these perspectives are non-systematic - by virtue of the subject/object gap. Because this systemic complexity, they are more arbitrary, even idealistic-chaotic (ie, animal spirits), than the presence of institutions seem to suggest - for they direct them, not the other way round. Because values are themselves changing, and difficult to profile collectively, the role of information constraints are much less binding, than in systems of exchange of information with well-defined ends.
The point to note is that these definitions of (social science) real are wildly inaccurate depictions of reality, which is dynamic and indefinable. (Think of it as a consciousness.) They are used because they 1) create statistically modellable coherences of references to so-called reality along the broadest distinctions, made possible by sample sizes, and testable, 2) allow sub-units of a social system to cohere, but many important causal facts are themselves determined not through an individualist perspective, which is endogenous within the system (and therefore determines its coherence, and the well-working of parts) but collectively, as a system, or as layers of quickly forming and dissoluting systems, in reaction to external causes upon the system, one of which is individuality itself.
Wednesday, December 05, 2012
My surroundings
Politics is played out within the context of a political culture. It was interesting to note that a fashion retailer named 'Hitler' opened recently in India. You can read it here. It was, and remains, an excellent starting point for the construction of an upper-middle class bracket fashion brand. (Think fcuk with more tongue-in-cheek malevolence). Nevertheless, it was closed, for obvious reasons. But more interestingly, it reflects again the need to suppress an ideology that has continued resonance and holds political dangers and pitfalls to the West in a way that is completely unimaginable, even comical, within the cultural context of India.
As an international student studying in UK, it is interesting to observe that the role that liberal dogmatism plays in this cultural context is essentially a reaction formation. Counterintuitively, it is a response not to bourgeoisie conservative ideology, but to social Darwinism, and the implicit longings of purity and supremacy, whatever institutional form it might take (individual, race, state, etc.). Love of the free market, and the success of the free market, is the counterbalancing force, and outlet, to this longing. Love of liberal ideology takes the form of faith. A sensitive and intelligent tyrant could potentially use this deep longing for the ends of an adopted messianic ideology - these possibilities exist richly, at least in my surroundings as I perceive it, in a way that is non-permitted and, more importantly, inconceivable in my home country (in Asia, not India). Here it is living flesh - facism is the repressed unconscious of my surroundings - a fundamental centrifugal force, as it were, among a plurality of competing forces - shallower, but louder, and uncensored, competing forces.
More to the point - if one desires purity, bodily transcendence and supremacy above all else, the distinction between individual and state, subject and object, that characterize superficial dichotomies in standard political discourse will prove empty. One kick and the edifice will crumble. That is why stagnating economic growth in Europe is so worrying.
One can operationalize this idea with Zizek's notion of rendering harmless through integration and humour. This is intuitively obvious. The fact that Indians may joke about Hitler shows that they have transcended Hitler in a way that the West has not. This is not necessarily a good thing.
Disclaimer: This is a obviously a highly subjective treatment, based on narrow exposure.
As an international student studying in UK, it is interesting to observe that the role that liberal dogmatism plays in this cultural context is essentially a reaction formation. Counterintuitively, it is a response not to bourgeoisie conservative ideology, but to social Darwinism, and the implicit longings of purity and supremacy, whatever institutional form it might take (individual, race, state, etc.). Love of the free market, and the success of the free market, is the counterbalancing force, and outlet, to this longing. Love of liberal ideology takes the form of faith. A sensitive and intelligent tyrant could potentially use this deep longing for the ends of an adopted messianic ideology - these possibilities exist richly, at least in my surroundings as I perceive it, in a way that is non-permitted and, more importantly, inconceivable in my home country (in Asia, not India). Here it is living flesh - facism is the repressed unconscious of my surroundings - a fundamental centrifugal force, as it were, among a plurality of competing forces - shallower, but louder, and uncensored, competing forces.
More to the point - if one desires purity, bodily transcendence and supremacy above all else, the distinction between individual and state, subject and object, that characterize superficial dichotomies in standard political discourse will prove empty. One kick and the edifice will crumble. That is why stagnating economic growth in Europe is so worrying.
One can operationalize this idea with Zizek's notion of rendering harmless through integration and humour. This is intuitively obvious. The fact that Indians may joke about Hitler shows that they have transcended Hitler in a way that the West has not. This is not necessarily a good thing.
Disclaimer: This is a obviously a highly subjective treatment, based on narrow exposure.
Sunday, August 19, 2012
Quotes 8
"Contrary to these conceptions, what has been happening in the West, I believe, is a widening disjunction between the social structure (the economy, technology, and occupational system) and the culture (the symbolic expression of meanings), each of which is ruled by a different axial principle. The social structure is rooted in functional rationality and efficiency, the culture in the antinomian justification of the enhancement of the self.
The sources of each impulse are quite different. The life-style of the social structure was shaped by the principle of calculation, the rationalization of work and of time, and a linear sense of progress. All of this derived, fundamentally, from the effort to master nature and technics, to substitute wholly new rhythms of life for those bound to the regularities of the season and the diminishing returns of the soil. Technical mastery was in turn fused with a character structure which accepted the idea of delayed gratification, of compulsive dedication to work, of frugality and sobriety, and which was sanctified by the morality of service to God and the proof of self-worth through the idea of respectability. To this extent, bourgeoisie society of the nineteenth century was an integrated whole (?) in which culture, character structure, and economy were infused by a single value system. This was the civilisation of capitalism at its apogee.
Ironically, all these was undermined by capitalism itself. Through mass production and mass consumption, it destroyed the Protestant ethic by zealously promoting a hedonistic way of life. By the middle of the twentieth century capitalism sought to justify (?) itself not by work or property but by the status badges of material possession and the promotion of pleasure. The rising standard of living and the relaxation of morals became ends in themselves as the definition of personal freedom.
The result has been a disjunction within the social structure itself.In the organization of production and work, the system demands provident behaviour, industriousness and self-control, dedication to a career and success. In the realm of consumption, it fosters the attitude of carpe diem, prodigality and display, and the compulsive search for play. But in both realms the system is completely mundane, for any transcendent ethic has vanished.
If the modern social structure - based as it is on technics and metrics - is a distinctively new kind of social organization in human history, then contemporary culture, in its concern with the self, combines the deepest wellsprings of human impulse with the modern antipathy to bourgeoisie society.
The antinomian dimension of culture has been a recurrent feature of human society, in which the dialectic of restraint and release was played out originally in religion and then in the secular moral order itself. The antinomian attitude, in fact, is the repeated effort of the self to reach out beyond: the attain some form of ecstasy (ex-stasis, the leaving of the body), to become self-infinitizing or idolatrous; to assert immortality or omnipotence. It source is the finitude of creaturehood and the denial by the self of the reality of death. It is the radical "I" asserting its imperishable survival against imperious fate...What in the nineteenth century was private and hermetic has become, in the 20th century effulgence of modernism, public and ideological. Contemporary culture, with the victory of modernism, has become anti-institutional and antinomian. Few writers "defend" society or institutions against the "imperial self". The older artistic imagination, however wild, was constrained by the shaping discipline of art. The new sensibility breaks down all genres and denies that there is any distinction between art and life. Art was formerly an experience; now all experience is to be turned into art."
Daniel Bell
The sources of each impulse are quite different. The life-style of the social structure was shaped by the principle of calculation, the rationalization of work and of time, and a linear sense of progress. All of this derived, fundamentally, from the effort to master nature and technics, to substitute wholly new rhythms of life for those bound to the regularities of the season and the diminishing returns of the soil. Technical mastery was in turn fused with a character structure which accepted the idea of delayed gratification, of compulsive dedication to work, of frugality and sobriety, and which was sanctified by the morality of service to God and the proof of self-worth through the idea of respectability. To this extent, bourgeoisie society of the nineteenth century was an integrated whole (?) in which culture, character structure, and economy were infused by a single value system. This was the civilisation of capitalism at its apogee.
Ironically, all these was undermined by capitalism itself. Through mass production and mass consumption, it destroyed the Protestant ethic by zealously promoting a hedonistic way of life. By the middle of the twentieth century capitalism sought to justify (?) itself not by work or property but by the status badges of material possession and the promotion of pleasure. The rising standard of living and the relaxation of morals became ends in themselves as the definition of personal freedom.
The result has been a disjunction within the social structure itself.In the organization of production and work, the system demands provident behaviour, industriousness and self-control, dedication to a career and success. In the realm of consumption, it fosters the attitude of carpe diem, prodigality and display, and the compulsive search for play. But in both realms the system is completely mundane, for any transcendent ethic has vanished.
If the modern social structure - based as it is on technics and metrics - is a distinctively new kind of social organization in human history, then contemporary culture, in its concern with the self, combines the deepest wellsprings of human impulse with the modern antipathy to bourgeoisie society.
The antinomian dimension of culture has been a recurrent feature of human society, in which the dialectic of restraint and release was played out originally in religion and then in the secular moral order itself. The antinomian attitude, in fact, is the repeated effort of the self to reach out beyond: the attain some form of ecstasy (ex-stasis, the leaving of the body), to become self-infinitizing or idolatrous; to assert immortality or omnipotence. It source is the finitude of creaturehood and the denial by the self of the reality of death. It is the radical "I" asserting its imperishable survival against imperious fate...What in the nineteenth century was private and hermetic has become, in the 20th century effulgence of modernism, public and ideological. Contemporary culture, with the victory of modernism, has become anti-institutional and antinomian. Few writers "defend" society or institutions against the "imperial self". The older artistic imagination, however wild, was constrained by the shaping discipline of art. The new sensibility breaks down all genres and denies that there is any distinction between art and life. Art was formerly an experience; now all experience is to be turned into art."
Daniel Bell
Saturday, August 18, 2012
Quotes 7
"The difficulty with the nineteenth-century conception of scarcity, which has carried over to the twentieth, is its definition of scarcity in physical terms; it was for this reason that abundance was counterposed to scarcity. But scarcity is not a zero-sum term of have or have-not. It is a measure of relative differences of preference at relative cost. In this sense the postulate of scarcity as an analytical concept underlies all of contemporary social science. It states axiomatically that all values are scarce relative to desires, that all resources are scare relative to wants. Economics deals with the allocation of scarce goods, political sociology with the regulation of competition among men for scarce values. To economize is to make the best use of limited resources among competing ends: the specification of the best mix of factors of production (at relative costs) with the most productive techniques (highest utilization) within the most effective scheduling (programming) of the flow of items; the outcome is the largest output at the least cost. For this reason the axial principle of economics is functional rationality. Political sociology is the study of the rules that regulate competition among men for wealth, power and esteem. But men have to accept these rules as fair and right if this competition is to proceed; men seek just authority. For this reason, the axial principle of political life is legitimacy."
***
"Politics, in contemporary society, is the management of social structure. It becomes the regulative mechanism of change. But any political decision necessarily involves some conception of justice, traditional, implicit, and now increasingly explicit. Men accept different principles of justice, or different hierarchies of value, and seek to embody them in social arrangements. Ultimately the differences between social systems lie not in their social structures (the arrangements of reward and privilege around the organization of the economy) but in their ethos. Capitalism was not just a system for the production of commodities, or a new set of occupations, or a new principle of calculation (though it was all of these), but a justification of the primacy of the individual and his self-interest, and of the strategic role of economic freedom in realizing those values through the free market. This is why the economic function became detached from other functions of Western society and was given free rein.
The political ethos of an emerging post-industrial society is communal, insofar as social goals and priorities are defined by, and national policy is directed to, the realization of those goals. It is socializing rather than economic, insofar as the criteria of individual utility and profit maximisation becomes subjected to broader considerations of social welfare and community interest."
Daniel Bell
***
"Politics, in contemporary society, is the management of social structure. It becomes the regulative mechanism of change. But any political decision necessarily involves some conception of justice, traditional, implicit, and now increasingly explicit. Men accept different principles of justice, or different hierarchies of value, and seek to embody them in social arrangements. Ultimately the differences between social systems lie not in their social structures (the arrangements of reward and privilege around the organization of the economy) but in their ethos. Capitalism was not just a system for the production of commodities, or a new set of occupations, or a new principle of calculation (though it was all of these), but a justification of the primacy of the individual and his self-interest, and of the strategic role of economic freedom in realizing those values through the free market. This is why the economic function became detached from other functions of Western society and was given free rein.
The political ethos of an emerging post-industrial society is communal, insofar as social goals and priorities are defined by, and national policy is directed to, the realization of those goals. It is socializing rather than economic, insofar as the criteria of individual utility and profit maximisation becomes subjected to broader considerations of social welfare and community interest."
Daniel Bell
Saturday, August 04, 2012
Quotes 6
"If equality of result is to be the main object of social policy - and it is the heart of the populist reaction against meritocracy - it will demand an entirely new political agenda for the social systems of advanced industrial countries. But no such political demand can ultimately succeed - unless it imposed itself by brute force - without being rooted in some powerful ethical system, and for this reason the concept of equality of result has become the Archimedean point of a major new effort to provide a philosophical foundation - a conception of justice as fairness - for a communal society.
In the nature of human consciousness, a scheme of moral equity is the necessary basis for any social order; for legitimacy to exist, power must be justified. In the end, it is moral ideas - the conception of what is desirable - that shapes history through human aspirations. Western liberal society was "designed" by Locke, Smith, and Bentham on the premise of individual freedoms and the satisfaction of private utilities; these were the axioms whose consequences were to be realized through the market and later through the democratic political system. But that doctrine is crumbling, and the political system is now being geared to the realization not of individual ends but of group and communal needs. Socialism has had political appeal for a century now not so much because of its moral depiction of what the future society would be like, but because of material disparities within disadvantaged classes, the hatred of bourgeoisie society by many intellectuals, and the eschatological vision of a "cunning" of history. But the normative ethic was only implicit; it was never spelt out and justified. The claim for equality of result is a socialist ethic (as equality of opportunity is the liberal ethic), and as a moral basis for society it can finally succeed in obtaining men's allegiance not by material reward but by philosophical justification."
Daniel Bell (1974)
In the nature of human consciousness, a scheme of moral equity is the necessary basis for any social order; for legitimacy to exist, power must be justified. In the end, it is moral ideas - the conception of what is desirable - that shapes history through human aspirations. Western liberal society was "designed" by Locke, Smith, and Bentham on the premise of individual freedoms and the satisfaction of private utilities; these were the axioms whose consequences were to be realized through the market and later through the democratic political system. But that doctrine is crumbling, and the political system is now being geared to the realization not of individual ends but of group and communal needs. Socialism has had political appeal for a century now not so much because of its moral depiction of what the future society would be like, but because of material disparities within disadvantaged classes, the hatred of bourgeoisie society by many intellectuals, and the eschatological vision of a "cunning" of history. But the normative ethic was only implicit; it was never spelt out and justified. The claim for equality of result is a socialist ethic (as equality of opportunity is the liberal ethic), and as a moral basis for society it can finally succeed in obtaining men's allegiance not by material reward but by philosophical justification."
Daniel Bell (1974)
Quotes 5
"The difficulty with the exoteric argument of Illyich - as with so much of modernism - is that it confuses experience, in all its diversities, with knowledge. Experience has to be made conscious, and this is done, as Dewey remarked, "by means of that fusion of old meanings and new knowledge that transfigures both." 'Knowledge' is the selective ordering, and reordering of experience through relevant concepts. (Situational) Reality is not a bounded world, "out there", to be imprinted on the mind as from a mirror, or a flux of experience to be sampled for its novelties according to one's inclination (or its relevance for "me"), but a set of meanings organized by the mind, in terms of categories, which establishes the relations between facts and infers conclusions.
Nor need there be, in principle, a contradiction between a cognitive and an aesthetic mode in which, as alleged, the technocratic orientation is concerned only with the functional and the adversary culture with sensibility - much as this may be true in sociological fact. In the very nature of knowledge, as Dewey observed, there has to be an interplay between the two: the cognitive makes the variety of experience more intelligible by its reduction to conceptual form; the aesthetic makes experience more vivid by its presentation in an expressive mode. The two reinforce each other in a singular way.
What has to be common to both is a reliance on judgement - the making of neccessary distinctions and the creation of standards which allow one to sort out the meretricious from the good, the pretentious from the enduring. Knowledge is a product of the self-conscious and renewable comparison and judging of cultural objects and ideas in order to say that something is better than something else (or more complex, or more beautiful, or whatever the standard one seeks to apply), and that something is truer. Inevitably, therefore, knowledge is a form of authority, and education is the process of refining the nature of authoritative judgements. This is the classic, and enduring, rationale of education.
But to this is added a special burden of the post-industrial society. One need not defend the technocratic dimensions of education - its emphasis on specialization and vocationalism - to argue that schooling becomes more necessary than before. By the very fact that there are now many more differentiated ways in which people gain information and have experiences, there is a need for the self-conscious understanding of the processes of conceptualization as the means of organizing one's information in order to gain coherent perspectives on one's experience. A conceptual scheme is a set of consistent terms which groups together diverse attributes of experience or properties of an object, in a higher order of abstraction, in order to relate them to, or distinguish them from, other attributes and properties. To see what is common and what is different about modes of experience, is the function of education. And just as the resolution of identity crisis for individuals is the amalgamation of discordant aspects of growing up into a coherent whole, so is 'knowledge' an organization of experiences, tested against other patterns of experience, in order to create consistent standards of judgement.
The function of the university, in these circumstances, is to relate to each other the modes of conscious inquiry: historical consciousness, which is the encounter with a tradition that can be tested against the present; methodological consciousness, which makes explicit the conceptual grounds of inquiry and its philosophical presuppositions; and individual self-consciousness, which makes one aware of the sources of one's prejudgements and allows one to re-create one's values through the disciplined study of the society. Education is the "reworking" of the materials of the past, without ever wholly surrendering its truths or bending to its pieties. It is a continuing tension, the tension between past and future, mind and sensibility, tradition and experience, which for all its strains and discomforts, is the only source of maintaining the independence of inquiry itself. It is the affirmation of the principle of intellectual and artistic order through the search for relatedness of discordant knowledge."
Daniel Bell
Nor need there be, in principle, a contradiction between a cognitive and an aesthetic mode in which, as alleged, the technocratic orientation is concerned only with the functional and the adversary culture with sensibility - much as this may be true in sociological fact. In the very nature of knowledge, as Dewey observed, there has to be an interplay between the two: the cognitive makes the variety of experience more intelligible by its reduction to conceptual form; the aesthetic makes experience more vivid by its presentation in an expressive mode. The two reinforce each other in a singular way.
What has to be common to both is a reliance on judgement - the making of neccessary distinctions and the creation of standards which allow one to sort out the meretricious from the good, the pretentious from the enduring. Knowledge is a product of the self-conscious and renewable comparison and judging of cultural objects and ideas in order to say that something is better than something else (or more complex, or more beautiful, or whatever the standard one seeks to apply), and that something is truer. Inevitably, therefore, knowledge is a form of authority, and education is the process of refining the nature of authoritative judgements. This is the classic, and enduring, rationale of education.
But to this is added a special burden of the post-industrial society. One need not defend the technocratic dimensions of education - its emphasis on specialization and vocationalism - to argue that schooling becomes more necessary than before. By the very fact that there are now many more differentiated ways in which people gain information and have experiences, there is a need for the self-conscious understanding of the processes of conceptualization as the means of organizing one's information in order to gain coherent perspectives on one's experience. A conceptual scheme is a set of consistent terms which groups together diverse attributes of experience or properties of an object, in a higher order of abstraction, in order to relate them to, or distinguish them from, other attributes and properties. To see what is common and what is different about modes of experience, is the function of education. And just as the resolution of identity crisis for individuals is the amalgamation of discordant aspects of growing up into a coherent whole, so is 'knowledge' an organization of experiences, tested against other patterns of experience, in order to create consistent standards of judgement.
The function of the university, in these circumstances, is to relate to each other the modes of conscious inquiry: historical consciousness, which is the encounter with a tradition that can be tested against the present; methodological consciousness, which makes explicit the conceptual grounds of inquiry and its philosophical presuppositions; and individual self-consciousness, which makes one aware of the sources of one's prejudgements and allows one to re-create one's values through the disciplined study of the society. Education is the "reworking" of the materials of the past, without ever wholly surrendering its truths or bending to its pieties. It is a continuing tension, the tension between past and future, mind and sensibility, tradition and experience, which for all its strains and discomforts, is the only source of maintaining the independence of inquiry itself. It is the affirmation of the principle of intellectual and artistic order through the search for relatedness of discordant knowledge."
Daniel Bell
Monday, July 16, 2012
Note 38
Spinning and reverting like a bent backed secretary on a failed project
flailing at the crumpled genepool of weakness and decay
much of misery and envy at the common stophouses and fires that consume fleetingly
much of the Moses-moustache of fishlike ice-worker's and deep-tunneled plays
the carbon wreck of a simple turnstile in a pleated cage
frothing at the columns of a watery human grave. Collapsing, and ruined,
stands a fatal tower. All is death.
Jaws clenched to a tightrope,
I observe her lips. They glow a tippery yellow,
like a sun-blocked notion of an apothecary mind.
You give chase, falling into horror of the emptiness of a caved jaw.
Much like the spinning of the pineapple juice in its industrial vat,
screaming, you drown, a fly in a blunt-edged bottle
of sensousness, death and its endlessness.
This is but hell, you say. What unearthed but roadsigns or dirt,
as you veer, crashing into disappearing treelines,
like a waterfall man, a stupid salmon, a five fingered reaching plump veined fool into the grains of the firmament.
Like an idiot, the world grins in it mirroring misery,
masterfully, you reach the road, tar in your livers,
and retrieving and releasing dirt, feeling its tension against your shoulders
a wounded, collapsing frame.
flailing at the crumpled genepool of weakness and decay
much of misery and envy at the common stophouses and fires that consume fleetingly
much of the Moses-moustache of fishlike ice-worker's and deep-tunneled plays
the carbon wreck of a simple turnstile in a pleated cage
frothing at the columns of a watery human grave. Collapsing, and ruined,
stands a fatal tower. All is death.
Jaws clenched to a tightrope,
I observe her lips. They glow a tippery yellow,
like a sun-blocked notion of an apothecary mind.
You give chase, falling into horror of the emptiness of a caved jaw.
Much like the spinning of the pineapple juice in its industrial vat,
screaming, you drown, a fly in a blunt-edged bottle
of sensousness, death and its endlessness.
This is but hell, you say. What unearthed but roadsigns or dirt,
as you veer, crashing into disappearing treelines,
like a waterfall man, a stupid salmon, a five fingered reaching plump veined fool into the grains of the firmament.
Like an idiot, the world grins in it mirroring misery,
masterfully, you reach the road, tar in your livers,
and retrieving and releasing dirt, feeling its tension against your shoulders
a wounded, collapsing frame.
Thursday, June 28, 2012
Nietzsche and Schopenhauer
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche differed greatly in their attitudes towards Mitleid as a moral system, and exploring these differences reveals important disagreements Nietzsche had with his great philosophical teacheri. Mitleid was a concept largely integrated with the psychological theory, the moral system and the metaphysical claims of both philosophers, and the significance of Mitleid can only be fully grasped in these terms. We will attempt to show what Schopenhauer and Nietzsche shared on their views of Mitleid in the first section, before examining their differences in the second.
Mitleid as defined by Schopenhauer involves the “immediate participation, independent of all ulterior considerations, primarily in the suffering of another, and thus in the prevention or elimination of it”ii, hence “I suffer directly with him, I feel his woe just as I ordinarily feel my own; and likewise, I directly desire his weal in the same way I otherwise desire my own”.iii For Schopenhauer, the moral value of an action resides in the nature of its motivations, and the “absence of all egotistic motivation is...the criterion of an action of moral worth”iv. Since Mitleid for Schopenhauer is the only means by which we truly adopt someone else’s suffering as our own, accordingly, “it is only insofar as an action has sprung from compassion does it have a moral value, and every action resulting from any other motives has none.v
Agreements about Mitleid will be summarized under two headings. First, they agreed that a morality of Mitleid necessarily requires psychologically-embedded egotistical willing as its precondition; egotism is the starting point of the development of all value judgements in the world.vi For Schopenhauer, the ego-perspective is an individualized representation of an essentially desiring Will, and therefore, it embodies a “natural standpoint”vii which wills its “existence and well-being”viii above all other considerations, elevating it to “colossal proportions”ix. In addition, “To be an end or aim means to be willed”x, and ends “exist only in reference to a will”xi, hence “every good is essentially relative; for it has its essential nature only in relation to a desiring will”xii, absolute good being a “contradiction” and an “impossibility”.xiiixiv Nietzsche takes a similar view, where the “origin of morality” and the “oldest moral judgements”xv are founded on self-interested valuations: “whatever injures me is something evil, whatever benefits me is something good”xvi, and our evaluations are adopted “out of fear”.xvii So egotism constitutes the desiring need, and needs are a precondition for value judgements: value judgements necessarily involving a hierarchization of some needs above others, which become incumbent upon agents to fulfil.
Second, that seemingly altruistic acts may stem from egotistic motivations, and are therefore, properly speaking, not morally good. Schopenhauer states that “in themselves, all deeds are merely empty figures, and only the [compassionate] disposition that leads to them gives them moral significance”xviii, but because this disposition “lies in the depth of our inner nature…we can hardly ever pronounce a correct moral judgement on the actions of others, and rarely on our own.”xix Nietzsche develops this view further. He sees motives for acts as “epistemically opaque”xx, and that “in no single instance, has the distance between knowledge and deed ever yet been bridged.”xxi This is because the motives for an act – the “actual clash of motives” when we perform the act, is “something completely invisible to us, of which we are unconscious”, and we “confuse the clash of motives with our [conscious] comparison of the possible consequences of different actions”.xxii Therefore it is impossible to give a conclusive moral judgement on any act. In addition, the egoism of Mitleid manifests itself, through its preoccupation with the mental state of the agent, not the sufferer, and its primary motivation, the “impulse for pleasure – pleasure arises in viewing a contrast to our situation, in the very idea of being able to help if only we so desired, in the thought of praise and gratitude, in the very activity of helping insofar as it is successful, thus allowing the performer to delight in himself”xxiii, and also by “fear's easily stimulated imagination...[and] a quick vanity which is offended when something happens that they could prevent”xxiv, also a pleasure in exercising “superiority” over the “degraded” recipient, that becomes a form of “charitable revenge”xxv, and finally, Mitleid involves “thinking about ourselves, no longer consciously, to be sure, but very powerfully so unconsciously”xxvi. The selflessness of Mitleid is only a pretence; Mitleid is merely part of our effort to recover psychological balance. Therefore, insofar as the motivations to act remain essentially grounded in the natural standpoint of the agent, it is difficult to give a precise account of how an altruistic intent can take root in the human mind at all, and consequently what real altruism, psychologically-speaking, really means; a difficulty which Schopenhauer called “the mystery of ethics”.xxvii
I will now highlight some of the concerns Nietzsche had with Schopenhauer’s morality of Mitleid.
1) It is necessarily based on a metaphysical support
2) It is based on self-deception and dissimulation, becoming a cover for the egoistic drives, thereby privileging one type of egoism above others arbitrarily
3) Mitleid as emotional obstacle to the free spirit's independence from conventional morality, also a distraction to free spirits, draining the human spirit, perturbing quietude
4) It falsely lays claim to being the sole morality
5) It creates a culture of decay
6) It is based on a pessimistic narrative of salvation, opposed to his Dionysian narrative of development
7) It breeds renunciatory ideals
The reliance of the morality of Mitleid on metaphysical support can be conceived in terms of two problems:
1) If the phenomenon of Mitleid requires egotistical willing as its precondition, how is it possible to derive an idea of 'the good', distinct from mere satisfaction of the will, and to locate it within the mutual interactions, in human relationships, of egotistical wills?
2) Second, if we are unable to give a psychological account of how altruistic intents are possible, and given the deceptive nature of consciously-represented motives, why do we suppose that real altruism is possible at all?
Unless we are able to give an account of how real altruism is possible, we are forced into two undesirable options: a) no good exists in the world, or b) the good derives from egoistical motives. Schopenhauer acknowledges these problems by claiming that his morality cannot be explained in psychological terms, and is necessarily founded on his metaphysicsxxviii, which involves a mystical-insight-based interpretation about our abilities to transcend the egoistical standpoint. This act of transcendence constitutes 'the good' because it intuits the truth: it pierces the veil of Maya and sees the oneness of all living things.xxix
Here, Nietzsche raises two problems. First, Schopenhauer's metaphysics features a circularity: he claims that compassion is possible by appealing to his metaphysics, however, his metaphysics depends on the possibility of compassion or pure aesthetic contemplation.xxx It is on these grounds that Nietzsche rejects the Schopenhauerian interpretation – not its entire possibility, but its credibility.xxxi Second, we can no longer rely on metaphysical theories in a post-Kantian world: “One could assert nothing at all of the metaphysical world except that it was a being-other, an inaccessible, incomprehensible being-other; it would be a thing with negative qualities...it is certain that knowledge of it will be the most useless of all knowledge.”xxxii Nietzsche proposes a replacement of Schopenhauerian metaphysics with a naturalistic drive-psychology; and this interpretation leaves open the possibility of truly altruistic acts, but in return, it effectively historicizes the development of the moral mode of evaluation as an adaptive instrument of societyxxxiii, where 'the good' as based on a transcendent principle is abolished, and the basis of morality of Mitleid along with it. Hence for Nietzsche, the morality of Mitleid is as groundless as all other moral ideals that rely on transcendental justification; the litmus test for the adoption of a morality becomes the second-order value to which the morality and its disciplining capabilities are employed; the “value of values”.xxxiv
Secondly, Mitleid is a means of exploiting the suffering of others to gain power over them, hence becoming a cover for an other-dependent egoism that thrives on the suffering of others, while masquerading as altruism. For Nietzsche, psychological probity reveals that the primary human motivation of self-interestxxxv translates into a social psychology whose primary driving force is the acquisition of power.xxxvi Mitleid is “a life-preserving power that makes existence bearable” by “meting out superiority in small doses”xxxvii, and in Dawn 133, Nietzsche contrasts Stoic virtues with Mitleid as “egotism of a type different from the compassionate.”xxxviii The egotism of Mitleid thrives on the suffering of others, allowing us to “gloat over the terror of the misfortunate man” to “walk away feeling satisfied and elevated”xxxix in a voyeurism that eases the experience of our own suffering. Therefore it is both the deceptive nature of Mitleid, and the reactive nature of Mitleidxl, which Nietzsche holds in contempt. Its dependence on the suffering of others means that it is in its long-term interest to promote suffering – it is partly in this sense that Nietzsche writes in Dawn 134: “Compassion...creates suffering.”xlixlii But his real target is not the tainted innocence of Mitleid and its deceptions as such, but our failure to appreciate the dangers of a morality of Mitleid.
Nietzsche turns his polemic aim on the morality of Mitleid as sociological and historical phenomena. He views the ideals of morality at any given historical period as contingent social constructs whose present forms must be traced to the struggle for ideological dominance among different classes, groups or institutions, mediated by factors such as economics, environment, etc.xliii Morality is the means by which to make man a function of society,xliv with society defined as an organizational means to achieve a certain set of ends, collectively defined as ultimate or necessary. So, Nietzsche dissects the value of the morality of Mitleid and the ideals it implies or tends to create, and finds them dangerous, inhibiting, limiting, and conducive to pessimism and cultural decay.
First, Mitleid posits an immediate value judgement on the presence of suffering – pain is 'bad', while comfort is 'good' - a “religion of comfortableness”xlv - thereby elevating the importance of short-term hedonistic affects, experiences, and value judgements above long-term considerations of self-cultivation, or development of the species.xlvi This aligns itself with the tendency of modern “commercial society”xlvii to strengthen, emphasize, and commoditize human needs and experiences; to integrate individuals into a socially cohesive whole; and to posit security as the highest possible social goalxlviii, thereby sacrificing Stoic virtues, genuine individuality, and creative human-species developmentxlix. In doing so, it marshals individuals into a conformity of the affects and the common “fog of opinions” developed by playing to these affectsl, thereby encroaching on the requirements of autonomous, individual self-cultivation.li The morality of Mitleid, embedded within these social trends, becomes another instrument for adapting the individual to fit the needs of the throng – a “herd morality”lii.
Furthermore, it gives the weak, hedonistic, or pessimistic kinds of man leverage over the strong, the creative, and the well-constituted, for its bids the latter to sensitize themselves to their own suffering and to concern themselves with the suffering of others, thereby serving up distractions to arduous creative tasks and conjuring up paralyzing forces to those whose job is to healliii. In addition, suffering is an affect relative to one's sensitiveness to it, and to the purpose and meaning to which one views it as directed towards.liv A morality of suffering breeds oversensitivity towards suffering in general. This results in three dangers: the net increase in felt sufferinglv, the decay of manlvi, and the breeding of renunciatory ideals.
Very briefly, a word on renunciatory ideals. While Nietzsche advocates the Dionysian ideal, through which an affirmation of life is made possiblelvii – the ideal associated with an overabundance of creative energies – Schopenhauer advocates a pessimistic ideal of the denial of the will-to-lifelviii – this will defined as the futile craving after transient, illusory and insatiable goals, which leads to suffering.lix This distinction is couched by Nietzsche in physiological terms: his “Dionystic” philosophy is for the strong and healthy, and Schopenhauer’s “will to nothingness” is for the weak and the sicklx. For Nietzsche, “Life” involves a self-overcoming and mastery of the conditions of one’s existence - conditions which potentially include the limiting effects of moral ideals – while for Schopenhauer, salvation from life requires a regime of renunciation of human needs, to stem the futility of willinglxi. Hence for Schopenhauer the morality of Mitleid is good because it renounces the egotistic standpoint and its accordant willing, but for Nietzsche it breeds pity and nausea, the two dangers that lead to nihilism, the last manlxii, and the extinction of man.
Hence Nietzsche's solution of Mitfreunde and laughter should be read as the counter-prescription to Schopenhauer's Mitleid and renunciation of will-to-life. Human relations ought to be conducive to the project of life-affirmation, and joy, not suffering, should be shared by over-full individuals.lxiii
Laughter, for Nietzsche, is the “epigram on the death of a feeling”lxiv, and (all) humour is the distillation of a process of suffering, of understanding, and transcendence of a tragic situation; divine comedy laughs away the tragedy of being-as-such.lxv Nietzsche therefore sets man a more difficult task: to overcome the horror of existence in a post-teleological, post-metaphysical world – and to learn to laugh.
1 GM, Preface 5, pg. 19
2 BM pg 144
3 Bm pg 143
4 Bm pg 140
5 Bm pg 144
6 For Kant, we are to examine, through a priori concepts, the formal conditions of the possibility of value judgements and any mode of evaluation (Sachs: “Nietzsche’s Daybreak: Towards a Naturalized Theory of Autonomy.” (2008), pg.96), without undue concern for the sphere of what actually happens – the motivating question being, how is the synthetic a priori categorical imperative possible? For Schopenhauer, ethics is approached through the “explanation and interpretation of what actually happens, in order to arrive at a comprehension of it.”(BM/52), the motivating question being, how is the empirically observable phenomenon of the moral act possible? Nietzsche's approach to morality operated largely within the problems raised by the Schopenhauerian framework operating in a naturalistic setting, as opposed to a metaphysical one.
7 WWR I pg 332
8 Bm pg 131
9 Bm pg 133
10 Bm pg 95
11 Bm pg 95
12 WWR I pg 362
13 WWR I pg 362
14 For Schopenhauer, “the meaning of the concept good...denotes the fitness or suitableness of an object to any definite effort of the will, therefore everything agreeable to the will, and fulfilling the will's purpose, is thought of through the concept good...[while] bad, denotes everything that is not agreeable to the striving of the will in each case”. (WWR I, pg. 360)
15 Dawn Note 102, pg 70
16 Dawn Note 102, pg 70
17 Dawn Note 104, pg 71
18 WWR I pg. 369
19 WWR I pg. 369
20 KAP: Notes on Compassion
21 Dawn 116, pg 86
22 Dawn 129. Pg. 96
23 Dawn 133, pg 102
24 Dawn 133, pg 102
25 Dawn 138, pg 106
26 Dawn 133, pg 102
27 Bm 144
28 Bm 144
29 For Schopenhauer, “to be just, noble, and benevolent is nothing but to translate my metaphysics into actions”, and proceeds from the “immediate and intuitive knowledge of the metaphysical identity of all beings”. (WWRII, pg 600-601)
30 More precisely, his claims that compassion is possible are based on an intuitive knowing that the veil of Maya has been transcended, but this interpretation of the experience of the revelatory insight is dependent on a metaphysical account that provides a framework for understanding the experience, and must therefore precede and cannot be given within it. In BGE 188, Nietzsche writes: “we suspect any thinker who wants to prove something – that they always knew in advance that which was supposed to result from the most rigorous cogitation.”
31 See Dawn 103: “I deny morality in the same way I deny alchemy, which is to say, I deny its presuppositions, not however that there were alchemists who did believe in these presuppositions and acted in accordance with them.”
32 HH9, pg 15
33 See WS40: Actions “performed first with a view to common utility have been performed by later generations for other motives”, fear, habit, benevolence and vanity, among others - “such actions, whose basic motive, that of utility, has been forgotten, are then called moral actions, not because they are performed out of these other motives, but because they are not performed from any conscious reason of utility. But this “hatred of utility which becomes visible here” points to the fact that the “hearth of morality...has had to struggle too long and too hard against the self-interest and self-will of the individual not at last to rate any other motive morally higher than utility. Thus it comes to appear that morality has not grown out of utility; while it is originally social utility, which had great difficulty in asserting itself against all individual private utilities and making itself more highly respected.”
34 GM, Preface Section 6, pg 20
35 Or more precisely, the egoism of the drives that constitute the self.
36 See GM Second Essay, Section 12, pg 76: “To speak of just or unjust in itself is quite senseless; in itself, of course, no injury, assault, exploitation, destruction can be “unjust”, since life operates essentially, that is in its basic functions, through injury, assault, exploitation, destruction and simply cannot be thought at all without this character...from the highest biological standpoint, legal conditions can never be other than exceptional conditions, since they constitute a partial restriction of the will of life, which is bent on power and are subordinate to its total goal as a single means: namely, as a means of creating greater units of power.
37 Dawn 136, pg 105
38 Dawn 133, pg 102
39 Dawn 224, pg 165
40 Although not explicitly written, it is clear, in the GM, that the morality of Mitleid could potentially serve the purpose in general of moralities built on ressentiments and the “slave revolt in morality”, which are initiated to establish “the weak” over “the strong”. See GMI Section 10, also Section
41 Dawn 134, pg 103
42 Of course, Nietzsche acknowledges redeeming qualities in compassionate acts, including the possibility of genuine altruism, and I think he would agree with Schopenhauer that Mitleid represents a higher position, in terms of mental discipline, than a narrow egoism defined by a hedonistic calculus, or the basest forms of utilitarianism; also the art and science of living today. It is in this sense that conventional morality has an important role to play, to temper our appetites and to recognize material suffering in the world. But it is here that one has to situate Nietzsche’s antimoral prescriptions within the very different roles he envisages for conventional morality and his form of esoteric morality, in the economy of the drives.
43 See GM, Preface Section 6: “There is needed a knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in which morality grew, under which they evolved and changed (morality as consequence, as symptom, as mask, as tartufferie, as illness, as misunderstanding; but also morality as cause, as remedy, as stimulant, as restraint, as poison.)”
44 Dawn 132, pg 100
45 GS 338, pg 270
46 For Nietzsche, in GS4 pg. 79: “the strongest and most evil spirits have so far done the most to preserve humanity, again and again they relumed the passions that were going to sleep...and they reawakened again the sense of comparison, of contradiction, of the pleasure in what is new, daring, untried; they compelled men to pit opinion against opinion, model against model.”
47 Dawn 174, pg127
48 Dawn 173, pg126
49 GS4 pg. 79; “What is new, however, is always evil, being that which wants to conquer and overthrow the old boundary markers and old pieties; and only what is old is good. The good men are in all ages those who dig the old thoughts, digging deep and getting them to bear fruit – the farmers of the spirit. But eventually all land is exploited, and the ploughshare of evil must come again and again.”
50 Dawn 105, pg 72
51 KAP, Notes on Compassion
52 GS 116, pg 174
53 See Dawn 134, pg 104: “but whosever wishes to serve as physician to humanity in any sense whatsoever will have to be very cautious with regard to that sentiment- it lames him in all decisive moments and paralyzes his knowledge and his benevolent delicate hand.
54 GMIII, Section 28, pg 162
56 See GS 338, pg 269: On the happiness of man: “Happiness and unhappiness are sisters and even twins that either grow up together, or remain small together….but the path to one’s own heaven always leads through the voluptuousness of one’s own hell.” On suffering as an accompaniment to growth and self-cultivation: “The whole economy of soul and the balance effected by distress, the way new springs and needs break open, the way in which old wounds are healing, the way whole periods of the past are shed – all such things that may be involved in distress.” On Mitleid’s effect on man, see GMIII Section 14: “The sick are man's greatest danger, not the evil, not the beasts of prey. Those who are failures from the start, downtrodden, crushed – it is they, the weakest, who must undermine life among men, who call into question and poison most dangerously our trust in life, in man, and in ourselves.”
57 See GS370, where the Dionysian is “He that is richest in the fullness of life...an overflowing energy that is pregnant with the future.” See EH, “Birth of Tragedy”, Section 2: “I was the first to see the real opposition: the degenerating instinct that turns against life with subterranean vengefulness (Christianity, the philosophy of Schopenhauer, the philosophy of Plato, and all of idealism as typical forms) versus a formula for the highest affirmation, born of over-fullness, a a Yes-saying without reservation, even to suffering, even to guilt, even to everything that is questionable and strange in existence.” See also EH, “Thus Spoke Zarathustra”, Section 6: “He that has the hardest, most terrible insight into reality, that has thought the “most abysmal idea”, nevertheless do not consider it an objection to existence, not even to its eternal recurrence – but rather one reason more for being himself the eternal Yes to all things, the tremendous, unbounded saying Yes and Amen - “Into all abysses I still carry the blessings of my saying Yes.” - But this is the concept of the Dionysus once again.”
58 WWR I, pg. 380
59 See WWRI, pg. 380: “If we compare life to a circular path of red-hot coals having a few cool places, a path that we have to run over incessantly, then the man entagled in delusion is comforted by the cool place on which he is just now standing , or which he sees near him, and sets out to run over the path.”
60 GS III Section 28, pg. 163
61 WWR I, pg. 393
62 GM III, Section 14, pg. 122
63 GS 338, pg. 271. See also WS350, pg.393.
64 HH. II: AOM.202, pg. 261
65 GS1, pg 74: “To laugh at oneself as one would have to laugh in order to laugh out of the whole truth – to do that even the best so far lacked sufficient sense for the truth, and the most gifted had too little genius for that.”
Mitleid as defined by Schopenhauer involves the “immediate participation, independent of all ulterior considerations, primarily in the suffering of another, and thus in the prevention or elimination of it”ii, hence “I suffer directly with him, I feel his woe just as I ordinarily feel my own; and likewise, I directly desire his weal in the same way I otherwise desire my own”.iii For Schopenhauer, the moral value of an action resides in the nature of its motivations, and the “absence of all egotistic motivation is...the criterion of an action of moral worth”iv. Since Mitleid for Schopenhauer is the only means by which we truly adopt someone else’s suffering as our own, accordingly, “it is only insofar as an action has sprung from compassion does it have a moral value, and every action resulting from any other motives has none.v
Agreements about Mitleid will be summarized under two headings. First, they agreed that a morality of Mitleid necessarily requires psychologically-embedded egotistical willing as its precondition; egotism is the starting point of the development of all value judgements in the world.vi For Schopenhauer, the ego-perspective is an individualized representation of an essentially desiring Will, and therefore, it embodies a “natural standpoint”vii which wills its “existence and well-being”viii above all other considerations, elevating it to “colossal proportions”ix. In addition, “To be an end or aim means to be willed”x, and ends “exist only in reference to a will”xi, hence “every good is essentially relative; for it has its essential nature only in relation to a desiring will”xii, absolute good being a “contradiction” and an “impossibility”.xiiixiv Nietzsche takes a similar view, where the “origin of morality” and the “oldest moral judgements”xv are founded on self-interested valuations: “whatever injures me is something evil, whatever benefits me is something good”xvi, and our evaluations are adopted “out of fear”.xvii So egotism constitutes the desiring need, and needs are a precondition for value judgements: value judgements necessarily involving a hierarchization of some needs above others, which become incumbent upon agents to fulfil.
Second, that seemingly altruistic acts may stem from egotistic motivations, and are therefore, properly speaking, not morally good. Schopenhauer states that “in themselves, all deeds are merely empty figures, and only the [compassionate] disposition that leads to them gives them moral significance”xviii, but because this disposition “lies in the depth of our inner nature…we can hardly ever pronounce a correct moral judgement on the actions of others, and rarely on our own.”xix Nietzsche develops this view further. He sees motives for acts as “epistemically opaque”xx, and that “in no single instance, has the distance between knowledge and deed ever yet been bridged.”xxi This is because the motives for an act – the “actual clash of motives” when we perform the act, is “something completely invisible to us, of which we are unconscious”, and we “confuse the clash of motives with our [conscious] comparison of the possible consequences of different actions”.xxii Therefore it is impossible to give a conclusive moral judgement on any act. In addition, the egoism of Mitleid manifests itself, through its preoccupation with the mental state of the agent, not the sufferer, and its primary motivation, the “impulse for pleasure – pleasure arises in viewing a contrast to our situation, in the very idea of being able to help if only we so desired, in the thought of praise and gratitude, in the very activity of helping insofar as it is successful, thus allowing the performer to delight in himself”xxiii, and also by “fear's easily stimulated imagination...[and] a quick vanity which is offended when something happens that they could prevent”xxiv, also a pleasure in exercising “superiority” over the “degraded” recipient, that becomes a form of “charitable revenge”xxv, and finally, Mitleid involves “thinking about ourselves, no longer consciously, to be sure, but very powerfully so unconsciously”xxvi. The selflessness of Mitleid is only a pretence; Mitleid is merely part of our effort to recover psychological balance. Therefore, insofar as the motivations to act remain essentially grounded in the natural standpoint of the agent, it is difficult to give a precise account of how an altruistic intent can take root in the human mind at all, and consequently what real altruism, psychologically-speaking, really means; a difficulty which Schopenhauer called “the mystery of ethics”.xxvii
I will now highlight some of the concerns Nietzsche had with Schopenhauer’s morality of Mitleid.
1) It is necessarily based on a metaphysical support
2) It is based on self-deception and dissimulation, becoming a cover for the egoistic drives, thereby privileging one type of egoism above others arbitrarily
3) Mitleid as emotional obstacle to the free spirit's independence from conventional morality, also a distraction to free spirits, draining the human spirit, perturbing quietude
4) It falsely lays claim to being the sole morality
5) It creates a culture of decay
6) It is based on a pessimistic narrative of salvation, opposed to his Dionysian narrative of development
7) It breeds renunciatory ideals
The reliance of the morality of Mitleid on metaphysical support can be conceived in terms of two problems:
1) If the phenomenon of Mitleid requires egotistical willing as its precondition, how is it possible to derive an idea of 'the good', distinct from mere satisfaction of the will, and to locate it within the mutual interactions, in human relationships, of egotistical wills?
2) Second, if we are unable to give a psychological account of how altruistic intents are possible, and given the deceptive nature of consciously-represented motives, why do we suppose that real altruism is possible at all?
Unless we are able to give an account of how real altruism is possible, we are forced into two undesirable options: a) no good exists in the world, or b) the good derives from egoistical motives. Schopenhauer acknowledges these problems by claiming that his morality cannot be explained in psychological terms, and is necessarily founded on his metaphysicsxxviii, which involves a mystical-insight-based interpretation about our abilities to transcend the egoistical standpoint. This act of transcendence constitutes 'the good' because it intuits the truth: it pierces the veil of Maya and sees the oneness of all living things.xxix
Here, Nietzsche raises two problems. First, Schopenhauer's metaphysics features a circularity: he claims that compassion is possible by appealing to his metaphysics, however, his metaphysics depends on the possibility of compassion or pure aesthetic contemplation.xxx It is on these grounds that Nietzsche rejects the Schopenhauerian interpretation – not its entire possibility, but its credibility.xxxi Second, we can no longer rely on metaphysical theories in a post-Kantian world: “One could assert nothing at all of the metaphysical world except that it was a being-other, an inaccessible, incomprehensible being-other; it would be a thing with negative qualities...it is certain that knowledge of it will be the most useless of all knowledge.”xxxii Nietzsche proposes a replacement of Schopenhauerian metaphysics with a naturalistic drive-psychology; and this interpretation leaves open the possibility of truly altruistic acts, but in return, it effectively historicizes the development of the moral mode of evaluation as an adaptive instrument of societyxxxiii, where 'the good' as based on a transcendent principle is abolished, and the basis of morality of Mitleid along with it. Hence for Nietzsche, the morality of Mitleid is as groundless as all other moral ideals that rely on transcendental justification; the litmus test for the adoption of a morality becomes the second-order value to which the morality and its disciplining capabilities are employed; the “value of values”.xxxiv
Secondly, Mitleid is a means of exploiting the suffering of others to gain power over them, hence becoming a cover for an other-dependent egoism that thrives on the suffering of others, while masquerading as altruism. For Nietzsche, psychological probity reveals that the primary human motivation of self-interestxxxv translates into a social psychology whose primary driving force is the acquisition of power.xxxvi Mitleid is “a life-preserving power that makes existence bearable” by “meting out superiority in small doses”xxxvii, and in Dawn 133, Nietzsche contrasts Stoic virtues with Mitleid as “egotism of a type different from the compassionate.”xxxviii The egotism of Mitleid thrives on the suffering of others, allowing us to “gloat over the terror of the misfortunate man” to “walk away feeling satisfied and elevated”xxxix in a voyeurism that eases the experience of our own suffering. Therefore it is both the deceptive nature of Mitleid, and the reactive nature of Mitleidxl, which Nietzsche holds in contempt. Its dependence on the suffering of others means that it is in its long-term interest to promote suffering – it is partly in this sense that Nietzsche writes in Dawn 134: “Compassion...creates suffering.”xlixlii But his real target is not the tainted innocence of Mitleid and its deceptions as such, but our failure to appreciate the dangers of a morality of Mitleid.
Nietzsche turns his polemic aim on the morality of Mitleid as sociological and historical phenomena. He views the ideals of morality at any given historical period as contingent social constructs whose present forms must be traced to the struggle for ideological dominance among different classes, groups or institutions, mediated by factors such as economics, environment, etc.xliii Morality is the means by which to make man a function of society,xliv with society defined as an organizational means to achieve a certain set of ends, collectively defined as ultimate or necessary. So, Nietzsche dissects the value of the morality of Mitleid and the ideals it implies or tends to create, and finds them dangerous, inhibiting, limiting, and conducive to pessimism and cultural decay.
First, Mitleid posits an immediate value judgement on the presence of suffering – pain is 'bad', while comfort is 'good' - a “religion of comfortableness”xlv - thereby elevating the importance of short-term hedonistic affects, experiences, and value judgements above long-term considerations of self-cultivation, or development of the species.xlvi This aligns itself with the tendency of modern “commercial society”xlvii to strengthen, emphasize, and commoditize human needs and experiences; to integrate individuals into a socially cohesive whole; and to posit security as the highest possible social goalxlviii, thereby sacrificing Stoic virtues, genuine individuality, and creative human-species developmentxlix. In doing so, it marshals individuals into a conformity of the affects and the common “fog of opinions” developed by playing to these affectsl, thereby encroaching on the requirements of autonomous, individual self-cultivation.li The morality of Mitleid, embedded within these social trends, becomes another instrument for adapting the individual to fit the needs of the throng – a “herd morality”lii.
Furthermore, it gives the weak, hedonistic, or pessimistic kinds of man leverage over the strong, the creative, and the well-constituted, for its bids the latter to sensitize themselves to their own suffering and to concern themselves with the suffering of others, thereby serving up distractions to arduous creative tasks and conjuring up paralyzing forces to those whose job is to healliii. In addition, suffering is an affect relative to one's sensitiveness to it, and to the purpose and meaning to which one views it as directed towards.liv A morality of suffering breeds oversensitivity towards suffering in general. This results in three dangers: the net increase in felt sufferinglv, the decay of manlvi, and the breeding of renunciatory ideals.
Very briefly, a word on renunciatory ideals. While Nietzsche advocates the Dionysian ideal, through which an affirmation of life is made possiblelvii – the ideal associated with an overabundance of creative energies – Schopenhauer advocates a pessimistic ideal of the denial of the will-to-lifelviii – this will defined as the futile craving after transient, illusory and insatiable goals, which leads to suffering.lix This distinction is couched by Nietzsche in physiological terms: his “Dionystic” philosophy is for the strong and healthy, and Schopenhauer’s “will to nothingness” is for the weak and the sicklx. For Nietzsche, “Life” involves a self-overcoming and mastery of the conditions of one’s existence - conditions which potentially include the limiting effects of moral ideals – while for Schopenhauer, salvation from life requires a regime of renunciation of human needs, to stem the futility of willinglxi. Hence for Schopenhauer the morality of Mitleid is good because it renounces the egotistic standpoint and its accordant willing, but for Nietzsche it breeds pity and nausea, the two dangers that lead to nihilism, the last manlxii, and the extinction of man.
Hence Nietzsche's solution of Mitfreunde and laughter should be read as the counter-prescription to Schopenhauer's Mitleid and renunciation of will-to-life. Human relations ought to be conducive to the project of life-affirmation, and joy, not suffering, should be shared by over-full individuals.lxiii
Laughter, for Nietzsche, is the “epigram on the death of a feeling”lxiv, and (all) humour is the distillation of a process of suffering, of understanding, and transcendence of a tragic situation; divine comedy laughs away the tragedy of being-as-such.lxv Nietzsche therefore sets man a more difficult task: to overcome the horror of existence in a post-teleological, post-metaphysical world – and to learn to laugh.
1 GM, Preface 5, pg. 19
2 BM pg 144
3 Bm pg 143
4 Bm pg 140
5 Bm pg 144
6 For Kant, we are to examine, through a priori concepts, the formal conditions of the possibility of value judgements and any mode of evaluation (Sachs: “Nietzsche’s Daybreak: Towards a Naturalized Theory of Autonomy.” (2008), pg.96), without undue concern for the sphere of what actually happens – the motivating question being, how is the synthetic a priori categorical imperative possible? For Schopenhauer, ethics is approached through the “explanation and interpretation of what actually happens, in order to arrive at a comprehension of it.”(BM/52), the motivating question being, how is the empirically observable phenomenon of the moral act possible? Nietzsche's approach to morality operated largely within the problems raised by the Schopenhauerian framework operating in a naturalistic setting, as opposed to a metaphysical one.
7 WWR I pg 332
8 Bm pg 131
9 Bm pg 133
10 Bm pg 95
11 Bm pg 95
12 WWR I pg 362
13 WWR I pg 362
14 For Schopenhauer, “the meaning of the concept good...denotes the fitness or suitableness of an object to any definite effort of the will, therefore everything agreeable to the will, and fulfilling the will's purpose, is thought of through the concept good...[while] bad, denotes everything that is not agreeable to the striving of the will in each case”. (WWR I, pg. 360)
15 Dawn Note 102, pg 70
16 Dawn Note 102, pg 70
17 Dawn Note 104, pg 71
18 WWR I pg. 369
19 WWR I pg. 369
20 KAP: Notes on Compassion
21 Dawn 116, pg 86
22 Dawn 129. Pg. 96
23 Dawn 133, pg 102
24 Dawn 133, pg 102
25 Dawn 138, pg 106
26 Dawn 133, pg 102
27 Bm 144
28 Bm 144
29 For Schopenhauer, “to be just, noble, and benevolent is nothing but to translate my metaphysics into actions”, and proceeds from the “immediate and intuitive knowledge of the metaphysical identity of all beings”. (WWRII, pg 600-601)
30 More precisely, his claims that compassion is possible are based on an intuitive knowing that the veil of Maya has been transcended, but this interpretation of the experience of the revelatory insight is dependent on a metaphysical account that provides a framework for understanding the experience, and must therefore precede and cannot be given within it. In BGE 188, Nietzsche writes: “we suspect any thinker who wants to prove something – that they always knew in advance that which was supposed to result from the most rigorous cogitation.”
31 See Dawn 103: “I deny morality in the same way I deny alchemy, which is to say, I deny its presuppositions, not however that there were alchemists who did believe in these presuppositions and acted in accordance with them.”
32 HH9, pg 15
33 See WS40: Actions “performed first with a view to common utility have been performed by later generations for other motives”, fear, habit, benevolence and vanity, among others - “such actions, whose basic motive, that of utility, has been forgotten, are then called moral actions, not because they are performed out of these other motives, but because they are not performed from any conscious reason of utility. But this “hatred of utility which becomes visible here” points to the fact that the “hearth of morality...has had to struggle too long and too hard against the self-interest and self-will of the individual not at last to rate any other motive morally higher than utility. Thus it comes to appear that morality has not grown out of utility; while it is originally social utility, which had great difficulty in asserting itself against all individual private utilities and making itself more highly respected.”
34 GM, Preface Section 6, pg 20
35 Or more precisely, the egoism of the drives that constitute the self.
36 See GM Second Essay, Section 12, pg 76: “To speak of just or unjust in itself is quite senseless; in itself, of course, no injury, assault, exploitation, destruction can be “unjust”, since life operates essentially, that is in its basic functions, through injury, assault, exploitation, destruction and simply cannot be thought at all without this character...from the highest biological standpoint, legal conditions can never be other than exceptional conditions, since they constitute a partial restriction of the will of life, which is bent on power and are subordinate to its total goal as a single means: namely, as a means of creating greater units of power.
37 Dawn 136, pg 105
38 Dawn 133, pg 102
39 Dawn 224, pg 165
40 Although not explicitly written, it is clear, in the GM, that the morality of Mitleid could potentially serve the purpose in general of moralities built on ressentiments and the “slave revolt in morality”, which are initiated to establish “the weak” over “the strong”. See GMI Section 10, also Section
41 Dawn 134, pg 103
42 Of course, Nietzsche acknowledges redeeming qualities in compassionate acts, including the possibility of genuine altruism, and I think he would agree with Schopenhauer that Mitleid represents a higher position, in terms of mental discipline, than a narrow egoism defined by a hedonistic calculus, or the basest forms of utilitarianism; also the art and science of living today. It is in this sense that conventional morality has an important role to play, to temper our appetites and to recognize material suffering in the world. But it is here that one has to situate Nietzsche’s antimoral prescriptions within the very different roles he envisages for conventional morality and his form of esoteric morality, in the economy of the drives.
43 See GM, Preface Section 6: “There is needed a knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in which morality grew, under which they evolved and changed (morality as consequence, as symptom, as mask, as tartufferie, as illness, as misunderstanding; but also morality as cause, as remedy, as stimulant, as restraint, as poison.)”
44 Dawn 132, pg 100
45 GS 338, pg 270
46 For Nietzsche, in GS4 pg. 79: “the strongest and most evil spirits have so far done the most to preserve humanity, again and again they relumed the passions that were going to sleep...and they reawakened again the sense of comparison, of contradiction, of the pleasure in what is new, daring, untried; they compelled men to pit opinion against opinion, model against model.”
47 Dawn 174, pg127
48 Dawn 173, pg126
49 GS4 pg. 79; “What is new, however, is always evil, being that which wants to conquer and overthrow the old boundary markers and old pieties; and only what is old is good. The good men are in all ages those who dig the old thoughts, digging deep and getting them to bear fruit – the farmers of the spirit. But eventually all land is exploited, and the ploughshare of evil must come again and again.”
50 Dawn 105, pg 72
51 KAP, Notes on Compassion
52 GS 116, pg 174
53 See Dawn 134, pg 104: “but whosever wishes to serve as physician to humanity in any sense whatsoever will have to be very cautious with regard to that sentiment- it lames him in all decisive moments and paralyzes his knowledge and his benevolent delicate hand.
54 GMIII, Section 28, pg 162
56 See GS 338, pg 269: On the happiness of man: “Happiness and unhappiness are sisters and even twins that either grow up together, or remain small together….but the path to one’s own heaven always leads through the voluptuousness of one’s own hell.” On suffering as an accompaniment to growth and self-cultivation: “The whole economy of soul and the balance effected by distress, the way new springs and needs break open, the way in which old wounds are healing, the way whole periods of the past are shed – all such things that may be involved in distress.” On Mitleid’s effect on man, see GMIII Section 14: “The sick are man's greatest danger, not the evil, not the beasts of prey. Those who are failures from the start, downtrodden, crushed – it is they, the weakest, who must undermine life among men, who call into question and poison most dangerously our trust in life, in man, and in ourselves.”
57 See GS370, where the Dionysian is “He that is richest in the fullness of life...an overflowing energy that is pregnant with the future.” See EH, “Birth of Tragedy”, Section 2: “I was the first to see the real opposition: the degenerating instinct that turns against life with subterranean vengefulness (Christianity, the philosophy of Schopenhauer, the philosophy of Plato, and all of idealism as typical forms) versus a formula for the highest affirmation, born of over-fullness, a a Yes-saying without reservation, even to suffering, even to guilt, even to everything that is questionable and strange in existence.” See also EH, “Thus Spoke Zarathustra”, Section 6: “He that has the hardest, most terrible insight into reality, that has thought the “most abysmal idea”, nevertheless do not consider it an objection to existence, not even to its eternal recurrence – but rather one reason more for being himself the eternal Yes to all things, the tremendous, unbounded saying Yes and Amen - “Into all abysses I still carry the blessings of my saying Yes.” - But this is the concept of the Dionysus once again.”
58 WWR I, pg. 380
59 See WWRI, pg. 380: “If we compare life to a circular path of red-hot coals having a few cool places, a path that we have to run over incessantly, then the man entagled in delusion is comforted by the cool place on which he is just now standing , or which he sees near him, and sets out to run over the path.”
60 GS III Section 28, pg. 163
61 WWR I, pg. 393
62 GM III, Section 14, pg. 122
63 GS 338, pg. 271. See also WS350, pg.393.
64 HH. II: AOM.202, pg. 261
65 GS1, pg 74: “To laugh at oneself as one would have to laugh in order to laugh out of the whole truth – to do that even the best so far lacked sufficient sense for the truth, and the most gifted had too little genius for that.”
Dream Notes
So I was in this lecture on psychoanalysis given by Jung and there were 3 Brit Indians sitting on my left. During question time one of them asked if technology in dream content affected the confessionary interpretation. Collins went on with a very long question of his own in his nasal, self-defeating voice which nobody hears or cares to. I was trying to avoid someone; the lecture hall emptied; I remained, thinking, finally some peace to ponder my questions and collect my thoughts.
I was on holiday with my parents in a Malaysian jungle resort. Apparently I must have been out wandering alone on the resort grounds, because when I reached the lobby, I found that I had known all along that I was checking out with my parents, and had my luggage with me. I left something in the room, went to get it, but I had to return to the rooms again after that to take the keys for checkout. Damn. Its a long walk back and forth and I should have done everything in one walk. I was just tired of going back to the chalet, for some reason.
Apparently we were being led in an assembly - or was it the beginning of an exercise? - by a figure in the image of ben tan. During this exercise he made several remarks of which i cannot remember, and asked a question which caused several people to leave. One of them had a distinctive socila awkward guy look: with white headphones cupped over his head and the usual detached absorption, and a white cap that hung with a pointed end over his forehead. He strolled away with the desolate yet seeming confidence of one who no longer cared. Apparently, when a second one left, from the silence of ben tan, we knew that they had been performing mastabatory handjobs on each other, and the remarks and questions were directed as half accusatory, half joking comments on them as an indication that he knew. Apparently I followed them in that weird shift of perspective, and saw one of them disappearing behind the grove around the school gates. I proceeded to the library on the right, full of empty tables and unfinished work, and with disjointed theories.
We were attempting to get something done, like destroying a castle, or saving someone. Apparently I was supposed to go into this room on the right that had a vent on the courtyard corridor to spy on something or to enter into something. It was surprisingly easy, and I just walked in. Then doug came in a super loud way, and I had to remove the bedsheets and quilt covers off the bed I was in to remove any evidence of my being there. Somehow I knew and kept telling myself that they will be here in 5 minutes, they will be here in 5 minutes. Me and doug got that done very quickly, and we were fine.
A vivid dream. In a house with the old family, but apparently we were living by a river with a depth of about 8 metres. Strangely, the house was built such that the ground floor fronted the waters of the river itself in the style of an aquarium - we could see the sealife and the odd fish or two. Well, the dykes upriver opened at a certain fixed time daily. Perhaps that was the reason for a daily rise in the river levels, which we did expect well in advance. Well, I saw an influx of fish at the time, and then a shark swam past the windows. It was in a predatory mood. This was shocking as the river was filled with bathers and rowers, and I thought of the danger that accrued to them by what, by all accounts, must seem like a lemon shark, ie, maneater, in what was largely considered an urban canal. I am now standing at the bridge, watching the bathers and rowers, and half-fearing, half-triumphant at the lurking danger.
I was on holiday with my parents in a Malaysian jungle resort. Apparently I must have been out wandering alone on the resort grounds, because when I reached the lobby, I found that I had known all along that I was checking out with my parents, and had my luggage with me. I left something in the room, went to get it, but I had to return to the rooms again after that to take the keys for checkout. Damn. Its a long walk back and forth and I should have done everything in one walk. I was just tired of going back to the chalet, for some reason.
Apparently we were being led in an assembly - or was it the beginning of an exercise? - by a figure in the image of ben tan. During this exercise he made several remarks of which i cannot remember, and asked a question which caused several people to leave. One of them had a distinctive socila awkward guy look: with white headphones cupped over his head and the usual detached absorption, and a white cap that hung with a pointed end over his forehead. He strolled away with the desolate yet seeming confidence of one who no longer cared. Apparently, when a second one left, from the silence of ben tan, we knew that they had been performing mastabatory handjobs on each other, and the remarks and questions were directed as half accusatory, half joking comments on them as an indication that he knew. Apparently I followed them in that weird shift of perspective, and saw one of them disappearing behind the grove around the school gates. I proceeded to the library on the right, full of empty tables and unfinished work, and with disjointed theories.
We were attempting to get something done, like destroying a castle, or saving someone. Apparently I was supposed to go into this room on the right that had a vent on the courtyard corridor to spy on something or to enter into something. It was surprisingly easy, and I just walked in. Then doug came in a super loud way, and I had to remove the bedsheets and quilt covers off the bed I was in to remove any evidence of my being there. Somehow I knew and kept telling myself that they will be here in 5 minutes, they will be here in 5 minutes. Me and doug got that done very quickly, and we were fine.
A vivid dream. In a house with the old family, but apparently we were living by a river with a depth of about 8 metres. Strangely, the house was built such that the ground floor fronted the waters of the river itself in the style of an aquarium - we could see the sealife and the odd fish or two. Well, the dykes upriver opened at a certain fixed time daily. Perhaps that was the reason for a daily rise in the river levels, which we did expect well in advance. Well, I saw an influx of fish at the time, and then a shark swam past the windows. It was in a predatory mood. This was shocking as the river was filled with bathers and rowers, and I thought of the danger that accrued to them by what, by all accounts, must seem like a lemon shark, ie, maneater, in what was largely considered an urban canal. I am now standing at the bridge, watching the bathers and rowers, and half-fearing, half-triumphant at the lurking danger.
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