The Self 2 (Control)

The Self includes within it a theory of control. When one does something or thinks something, and that thing appears to be caused by a preceding thought, or it appears that the preceding thought or will to do that thing then leads to that thing being done, we attribute the cause of that thought or act to the preceding state. Phenomenologically speaking, that preceding state is still a drive, which is neither internal nor external. It is neither me nor not me. So is the state which is apparently caused. Consciousness does not distinguish them as being me or not me. Again, it is comparatively, that the thought is private in character, and no other private thought or thing in the world (other than the brain) appearing to correspond to a cause of the thought or act, that gives rise to a retroactive attribution of both states to the person. The concept of control is therefore a pragmatic construct, while the concept of I stemming from control a social comparative one. Pragmatic in the sense that for the purposes of acting, it distinguishes between different types of causes, one which appears to stem from the externally observable world, and another which appears to stem from what is not the externally observable world, although the latter is indefinable not being observable. It is a residual. This theory of the internal and external in terms of cause inductively attributes causation and control to the preceding drive or state, and is an attribution based on a manner of acting in the world. It is a relative concept in relation to the interaction with the physical environment due to action. It is then the social comparative aspect that gives the "not external" residual category flesh or substance. This means that comparatively, society attributes those "not external" states to have the closest causal connection with the subsequent state or act. This construct of the internal person makes sense of the phenomenological experience, by attributing casual relation between the preceding drives and post states or acts, and attributing a unity or identity of being, represented by the external social identity, on that person to which the effective causal states are attributed. This ontological I construct, whether called the individualised soul or something else, has both social and cosmic connotations. In the realm of social control, causal mechanisms, reasons and responsibilities of various kinds are placed on this residual. This may be linked to religious concepts of soul, which explains the responsibilities or ethical obligations of the individual in society. The I may also have communitarian connotations, which give rise to obligations to family or clan which is tied up with the interiority of the causally acting "I". That is, the ancestors also act through the I, it is not merely the autonomous soul that does everything. The point is that because the casual mechanisms and the "not external" causing subject is essentially undefined and amorphous, this is a container to which social or theoretical constructs can fill the gap. In other words, religious or social development (in the broadest sense) is in large part, the development of the language game of the missing "I". This is the history of the world. The ineffable "I" is objectified and instrumentalised for the purposes of a social or theological ideology to express the being of the objectives of such ideology into the world. The human collective exists in a Matrix-machine like relationship to such ideology, instrumentalising themselves to feed its objective, while benefiting from it in the form of better material standards and potentialities for self-development, and at a micro-level, the purported benefits of relative status markers which are essentially comparative constructs within a language game, the carrots and sticks to subtly enforce compliance. More prosaically, the objectification of the I is also a pragmatic form of social control, to make the I responsible for his acts in the world.