Plato's short dialogue on piety culminates in negatives; its greatest insight is to expose the fundamental incompatibilities of two disparate cosmological propositions: that of a universally valid standard of meaning and the good, against the standards seen to derive from the caprices of the Greek pantheon. This contradiction has come to be known as the Euthyphro's dilemma.
However, the present interest lies in the fact that this incompatibility was not in itself the main focus at the point where it was raised. Socrates introduced the issue in his attempts to examine and disprove Euthyphro's assertion that the pious is that which is God-loved. For simplicity's sake, we will take that to mean that a necessary but insufficient aspect of the pious, is that it is God-loved.
Socrates's arguments run as such:
1. A thing is God-loved because God loves the thing, not because it is inherently God-loved. (The adverb sequentially succeeds the verb. Being God-loved is not a quality inherent in the thing).
2. The pious is God-loved because of its piousness. (Being God-loved is a quality inherent in the definition of piousness).
3. From 2, it follows that (all?) God-loved things are God-loved because they are inherently God-loved.
4. This in opposition to 1., therefore only one of the statements, 1 or 2, can be true; being mutually exclusive, they cannot be true at the same time.
Now, the fishy points in the argument lie in 2 and 3. It becomes apparent after some thought that in the course of the argument, Socrates must commit the implicit assumption that if piousness was pious not because of God's love (but due to some external standard), then God's love of piousness must derive not from God's act of loving, but from the implicit inherency of God's love as a quality in the thing. In other words, it assumes that the only way in which God can love the pious is if that which God-loves (namely, the pious) was, in essence the God-loved. By that score, nothing that is God-loved can be anything else but THE God-loved. Again, in other words, it assumes the truth of the bracketed statement in thread 2 of the above argument, when of course, requiring God's love by definition certainly does not mean in any way that something is God-loved in its original state. It is a complex form of the age-old straw man fallacy.
This would then trap Euthyphro in the depths of the Euthyphro dilemma which is in fact not bound up directly with the argument at hand.
