Note 146

Systems of thought may share reference points and patterns in the way its concepts refer to other concepts and things, that can be translated to other systems of thought- and others which may not be so translatable. This is not because they are cognitively incommensurable but because the significance of the component relationship or idea can only be grasped in terms of the broader implications it has for the system of thought to which it relates, which therefore conditions it’s meaning. In that sense, the way concepts refer to common phenomena, are an anchor point for referencing across systems.

This has nothing to do with the broader point about the ontological reality of the reference, but the epistemic one about the role that the reference plays in our language games when we posit systems of thought.

This is not pre-determined by the theory, but by how we choose to understand it, as a description of a plural reality, or a description of a single reality. If we are agnostic to this and see it as an interpretation of experienced reality, there is no reason why one account can not replace another, unless it is defined (problematicized) differently.

Note 145

What is the teleology of things? A cause, value, identity nexus. Intellection is a part of this process, so it is inherently conservative.

Systems are a composite of things, and an interaction of micro-teleologies. Incorporation is part of a process of changes in teleological aims, preserved through individual identities and social forms, as the developmental process (combining dialectics, technological re-parameterization; and emergent choices) alters the teleological structure over time.

Note 144

The world lies in the coexistence of opposites. The paradox is the knot that ties the idea to reality.

Is a system of binaries, like a binary code, a fact about the world, or a condition of our thought? Or a condition of the process of framing? Are any of these questions meaningfully answerable?