Note 97

The world as a series of revolutions, the dialectical self-overcoming of power, and the re-formation of the constellation of institutions around the evolution of the core institutions of power. At the macro level then, the dynamics of a will to power.

***
What is the greatest good also contains within it the greatest evil. What is the greatest joy also contains within it the greatest suffering. That is the lesson that Nietzsche learned.

Hegel 3

"Now" as a way of characterizing change relationships as particulars of a universal object now. This is dialectical - ie, not logical - the negation of its negation is not it. It particularizes the universal through the role of the observing subject within the language game. Similarly for other identifiers.

***

The existing object referred to particularizes the universal. But the context of the object constitutes the meaning through which the universal is made particular in thought. In the case of concept, the universalized form of the object is itself the means through which the universal is particularized in thought. So a mental object is really a universal holding a mirror up to itself in order to be thought.

Note 96

The discreteness of social and political reality; the dissolution of personality.

Hegel 2

Hegel

1. Consciousness is subjective (criterion is for-itself)
2. But the criterion references the in-itself.

Contra Hegel, truth does not reference the agent of truth. Subjectivity as contingent, because the form within which it is is not given within the criteria of the in-itself. Truths for us reference the agent, for example those in social studies or quantum mechanics, but these are contingent facts which are not generalizable relations between truth and subject. The criterion for truth for consciousness is for-itself, but this does not free the truth for consciousness from the criteria of the truth in-itself.

Reply: Perspectivism vs subjectivity. Irreducible epistemic perspectivism. Subjectivity as the agent of perspectival truth. But contra that, truth is constituted by the underlying content within which something is framed. Truth lies behind the conscious framed perspectival truth. The act of framing is the act of standing outside of the truth to represent it to the mind, so it can be used, verified etc.

So what constitutes the criteria of for-itself is not for-itself per se. And what is the for-itself is framed truth which is not itself the truth to which it refers; therefore, learning is the reverse act of coverting the for-itself of framed truth into the in-itself of truth. In this way, the in-itself of truth can be repurposed into other contexts of the for-itself of framed truth.

In fact, the concept of knowledge rests on this distinction. Hence it cannot be that a fact can bridge a conceptual distinction.

Gift

Your gift to the world is to spread your love of a thing, to express and share it.

Note 95

Freedom is negation, a constant stepping outside of the frame of meaning of an activity. Thought is one of the products of freedom, of which the source is a nothingness which holds something before it, but which lies beyond it. The thought may be used to bring forward the dialectic, or to negate it. In bringing the dialectic forward, the source of freedom, the negation itself, is incorporated into the process and it's actuality.

Hegel 1

Hegel's task is the reconciliation of substance and subject, and being-in-itself and being-for-itself. Teleology is the thread through which the for-itself overcomes its necessary subjectivity and unites with the in-itself by being contained within the moments of the in-itself. This applies to objects, as well as the reflexive individual.

But by providing an account of truth as an event, he answers not the question of what is truth, but of what truth is. This is properly the realm of meta-history, or science, not philosophy.

***
In existence, the field of othering, which is the field in which something is said to exist, is itself created by the subject identifying itself as content, that is to say, self-identical determinateness.

***
There are two kinds of negation: internal self-othering and external negation.

***
Concept incorporating Being, and Being incorporating Concept, in a logical necessity, as the world. In incorporating the specific content of the world into forms of knowledge, the Notion is grasped.