Note 105

One of the tasks in philosophy is to understand the roles of content and structure, to distinguish features within concepts which embody necessary structural forms from that which is contingent.

For example, in the argument over the fact-value distinction, there is a two-level separation: the selection of principles underlying rational acceptability is value-driven, while the notion of fact which is attributed to statements which fulfil the condition of rational acceptability is not, because they are not constituted by an intentional stance. As an example, while it is meaningful to say that what a computer states is true, it is meaningless to say that what a computer did is immoral.

This division is valid because the fact-value distinction is a matter of structural difference in notions, not of the ontological or conceptual content of the statements themselves. Hence, genealogical considerations are not relevant in the case here.

Within public debate, it may be right to note that choice of facts, and the selection of frames within which we relate facts to each other, must rely on pragmatic values. This is not to say that notions of facts themselves are empty without values.