Experience is constituted by an intentional stance as structure, and content given through it. Nothing can be given without both structure and content. It is nonsensical to speak of one without the other. Questions about the intentional stance are questions about the space of possible structures; questions about the facts of experience the space of possible contents.
Dualism is a means of relating the intentional stance to its contents. However, the intentional stance is not itself given in content, but content is given through it.
So, how to reinterpret intentional stance and content in a way that transcends dualism? One suggestion is to divorce perceptual content from facts about the world. So the experience of an intentional stance does not suggest a subject agent, and the experience of content does not suggest the presence of external objects.
Another would be to suggest that the intentional stance itself is the content of a language game. This leaves space for other types of language games (phenomenology, Dennett).
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