In what sense are sensations private? Is it an a priori statement? What is being said? In this manner of speaking, the I of the social identity is not the I of the intention. They occupy different language games, and is a way to bifurcate the external/internal world of experience.
This points to the fact that the self is constituted by different functions that are tied together by language and underpinned by observed consistencies.
Sensations are not intentions, as we can be unaware of intentions, and they are descriptions of internal motivational structures.
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Is it meaningless to say that "every rod has a length"? This presupposes a kind of contextual nominalism, where there is no property of length to which a rod belongs - it just is given as part of what a rod is - hence is tautological. He asks, can one imagine a rod without length?
But this is to ask the wrong question. One should ask: can one imagine length without a rod? For properties contain substance in thought, while substance contains properties in the way we think about the world.
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Can one play language games with oneself? Why not? Can rules be arbitrary, and in what sense? The functioning of a language game is independent of the correspondence of its rules to an independent truth; rather, its form is a matter of structural isomorphism with the form of life, which is fulfilled within the use of private language.
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