Personal Identity 1

The problem is that the form of correspondence of the correlation between the inside-out perspective of the “I” and the outside-in perspective of the “I” is arbitrary and pragmatic. They are not the same kind of object, and the connection cannot be derived from either perspective, but must be established by empirical experience. This makes it essentially unknowable.

The I is not fully identified with either, and both do not fully capture what I is as a set of phenomena.

The process of identifying the I as a set of phenomena and the I as attribution of self-same identity to that phenomena involves the integration of the phenomena to the contrasting frame through explanation.

For example, the I of the inside-out frame requires some way of differentiating internal from external phenomena, and the only way to do so is to establish that division via an externalist narrative of an object with special features in the world. Similarly, the I of the outside-in frame needs to establish the provenance of the material object via correlation of material observations with internal experiences. The combination of the two gives rise to the externalist narrative established via correlation of internal experience and the material world.

An object in two different frames of reference are thereby conflated with each other in a single language game of daily use.