Two definitions of freedom will be examined in relation to the above question. Firstly, it may be loosely defined as a freedom from x to do y, where x is defined as external obstructions to fulfilment of a given intention. Second, it is defined as the state of a position which one is in, determined by the number and desirability of the choices he is given. A major part of this essay will attempt to clarify the role of intention in according value to the abovementioned state of freedom.
Here, two preliminary observations are in order. It is immediately clear that the presence of choice is taken to be valuable in itself. For example, most students in this University would not even consider the possibility of choosing to be dropouts; nevertheless, the freedom to leave the University if one chooses would be considered a right valuable in itself (which, if suspended, would create protests of greater violence than those at present). (The problem of prudentiality will be addressed later.) A more general form of the above example is, doing a while one could do b, but knowing that one would have chosen a anyway, is better than not having the option of b at all. In other words, the presence of intention is not a necessary ingredient in the valuation of the choice; potentiality of intention is sufficient. The perceived value accruing the individual therefore cannot derive solely from the positive consequences of a. Second, agency is an insufficient ground for which to cite an intrinsic value for liberty. Consider an example: a random number generator. While the number generator is able to choose numbers, and potentially other numbers than the ones it has chosen, we do not value the presence of choice in the same way; that is, we do not attach to its freedom a moral value as we would to that of a living creature. Therefore the inclination to choose must contain certain characteristics before value can be accorded to its fulfilment.
Now we ask ourselves: what is the model through which one can understand the value of the presence of choice (liberty)? Three models are possible. The first one is: because the actions we are compelled to do, or the options we are given, never correspond ideally to the best possible desired outcome, a range in the quality and quantity of choices naturally means an increased probability in reaching a satisfaction-maximising point. Any value in the presence of choice is derived solely from the consequence of the best choice, that is, choice understood as a means to that end.
A second model: the value of the presence of choice accrues to the prudential accommodation of the possibility of changing needs. For example, person A is allergic to oranges while B is not. While B may choose to buy apples on a specific occasion, he values the choice that the seller provides him to get oranges in the future in a way that A does not. Of course A may value that fact of choice in recognition of different subjective preferences; the point is that the valuation of choice is a prudential means of recognizing difference over time and in individual preferences, therefore it remains an instrumental means to an end, the fulfilment of intentions which are inherently subject-determined.
The third model locates the value of choice in its being an actualization of the free will to select the preferences by which ends are deemed as good or not so good. This means that the expression of intention is deemed as good in itself. Is this a tenable claim? Why should we value the expression of free will for its own sake if free will does not generate a priori intentions towards its own satisfaction; if it does not exist as need?
A possible reply is that one requires free will to determine one’s own ends before these ends are found to have value; it is precisely through the act of choosing ends that they acquire value, which, by definition, is a conscious-realmed addendum to the primary mode of desiring an object. Therefore the crucial characteristic that distinguishes the human being from the number generator is the free will; we value liberty intrinsically because it is a prerequisite of value.
Unfortunately, this reply does not necessarily entail that liberty is valuable in itself; the defence merely claims that liberty as a state is a pre-condition of value, what is really valued is the intention, and the consequence (and perhaps, the moral faculty) that is enabled by liberty.
Therefore the definition of liberty as a relational concept remains; however, it is an error to suppose that our moral values align themselves to logical necessities. It is reasonable to claim that we value liberty for its own sake alongside the view that, factually speaking, it exists only as a condition for consequences also valued in themselves.
No comments:
Post a Comment