Note on Nietzsche Aphorism

I suppose that some readers may find my recent assignment on Nietzsche vaguely interesting, so here it is:

Exegesis on Aphorism 335 in “The Gay Science”

The aphorism can be split into four sections.

1) The attack on conscience and the moral affects
2) The attack on duty and the categorical imperative and the unknowability and uniqueness of human action and drives
3) The irrelevance of established morality to self-creators
4) The triumph of the will to truth and 'physics'

Within this aphorism, several trajectories of Nietzschean thought converge, firstly, the refutation of the metaphysical account and justification of the grounds of morality and its replacement by a genealogical and psychological critique that emphasizes its conditioned and contingent nature, second, a project to democratize morality as a set of values that must be determined largely by the individual in accordance with the specific conditions of his personal psychology and physiology, and third, the role of the sciences, self-observation, and the sceptical mode of enquiry in this process of cultivation of the drives.

This note will address the main arguments and issues Nietzsche raises for and against each of the four points. In doing so, it will address the threads raised above and hopefully cohere them into a possible interpretation of the aphorism as a whole.

Attack on Conscience and the Moral Affects

Nietzsche begins the attack on the psychology of moral motivations with two questions: first, is the act of making a moral judgement itself moral, and secondly, why is the moral affect of conscience taken as a justification for moral acts uncritically? To this, he claims that understanding the origins and psychological nature of these affects will “spoil these grand words for you!”i

Here the critique of conscience exists on two levels: first, while the conscience exists as an affect based upon, and activated in correspondence to our abstract moral principles to compel us to act in accordance with them, the reasons for which the moral affect is taken up as the overriding guide to action as opposed to our other drives are based on egoism, self-preservation, hedonism or plain ignorance and blind faith. Here Nietzsche asks: “For this faith- is there no conscience for that? Have you never heard of an intellectual conscience?”ii. In other words, he questions if we adhere to our conscience with morally justified reasons, and suggests we do not. Whether it is possible or not to have these reasons may be examined later.

Secondly, the abstract moral principles by which the conscience is conditioned are themselves products of tradition and social conditioning, which must be justified with reference to values different in nature from those which overtly motivate the conscience. As Nietzsche states in GS21:

“The praise of the selfless, the self-sacrificial, the virtuous...this praise certainly was not born from the spirit of selflessness. The neighbour praises selflessness because it brings him advantages. If the neighbour himself were “selfless” in his thinking, he would repudiate this diminution of strength, this mutilation for his benefit, he would work against the development of such inclinations, and above all he would manifest his selflessness by not calling it good! This indicates a fundamental contradiction in morality nowadays: the motives of this morality stand opposed to its principle.”iii

However, we may raise an objection. Given that moral affects favour a certain moral value, and given that the justification for the moral affects and the reasons for following them are themselves either instrumental upon other values based on self-interest of the individual or group, does this therefore make the outcome of the moral affects immoral, or does this make the adoption of the moral affect inconsistent in some way, morally speaking? This would be the case only if the satisfaction of the underlying value is incompatible in principle with values involved in the satisfaction of the moral outcome. However, it is seen that the (decision) situations involved in choosing to privilege the moral affect of conscience over other drives (or in adopting a moral principle for egotistical ends), where one by definition chooses between different self serving ends, is contextually different from the point where one chooses between egotistical ends and ends that consider others when one acts, before the moral act. That the latter decision situation is psychologically motivated by the former, does not entail that the principles that inform the latter are incompatible with those of the former. That second-order self-interest motivates first-order altruism does not necessarily entail that the principle of altruism has been violated, or that the agent in acting morally, is inconsistent in his virtues. This would only be the case if the self-deception on the part of the agent were complete, which is an oversimplification of agents.

However what successfully Nietzsche sought to topple was the notion that morality was universally binding in all circumstances and occasions, and that we can make clear demarcations between good virtues and evil vices; in showing that they are reciprocally conditioningiv, with the good having dark roots and depending upon the amoral drives, Nietzsche does not claim that we cannot be good, but that we do not have to be.

Attack on Duty and the Categorical Imperative

Nietzsche states in parenthesis: “The voice of conscience is never immoral, for it alone determines what is to be moral.”v However, one may consider a recourse from the moral affects to an ethics based on reasons.

Nietzsche attacks this dependence on the rational ethics:

“An original sin of philosophers. - Philosophers have at all times appropriated the propositions of examiners of humanity (moralists) and ruined them by taking the propositions unconditionally and wanting to demonstrate this as necessary...” [AOM 5]vi

Robert Guay, in an excellent article, interprets Nietzsche's attack on on morality as an attack on a “complex whose center is the search for a kind of normative stability” whose role is to generate “sound practical commitments”.vii The soundness of a code rests on its purity, where “morality is conceived as detached from any contingent concerns or features of the world”viii and its unconditionality; where “humanity must have something that it can obey unconditionally [D 207]ix, thereby preserving the stability and independence of its authority.x The comprehensiveness and universality of the claims of morality is explained in terms of its purity: independence of contingency ensured that no morally relevant differences between persons or suitably similar occasions obtained.xi

Nietzsche's attack on the purity, unconditionality and universality of morality takes several forms in GS335. Firstly, he cites the origins of morality, namely, its situatedness in cultural and political authorityxii and the conditional and revisable nature of the mores and traditions which they perpetuate which determine moralities [D9], secondly, the inability to specify “a universally recognized goal [which is a necessary condition before one could] propound such and such should be done” [D108], making any “unconditional feeling that here everyone must judge as I do” a “blind, petty and frugal selfishness” [GS335], third, the lack of independent and objective moral authority, given the conditionality and selfishness of the first order ethical principle of equality that underlies the “categorical imperative”, therefore opening up the danger of infinite regress when one questions the higher-order morality of morals, fourth, the uniqueness and unknowability of the psychological profile of the moral agent and his environment and therefore his act that debars any simplistic or universally meaningful application of second-order moral laws, or even any form of ethically-tinged judgement, upon acting agents, and fifth, the indemonstrability of the law of the mechanism by which our moral judgements cause our actions, thereby undermining the autonomy of the Kantian will.

The Irrelevance of Established Morality to Self-creators

Nietzsche dismisses the task of constructing a morality that lays claim to an objective ethical truth, for the reasons stated above. He proposes a more modest task: “Let us therefore limit ourselves to the purification of opinions and valuations and to the creation of our own new tables of what is good, and let us stop brooding about the moral value of our actions!”xiii

There are two main thrusts in his argument. Firstly, for Nietzsche, morality “trains the individual to be a function of the herd and to ascribe value to himself only as a function”, for “valuations and orders of rank [of impulses] are always expressions of the needs of a community and herd: whatever benefits it most- that is also considered the first standard for the value of all individuals.”[GS116] It turns men to creatures whose ideals do not necessarily correspond to the conditions of their individual flourishing[GS120]. In taking the individual to be an end-in-itself, “human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves”, he advocates the pursuit, or at least the equal legitimacy of the pursuit, of individually determined ends that require a freedom from the limits of morality as a contingent social construct.

Secondly, Nietzsche perceives the pervasiveness and insidiousness of moral valuations in ascribing significance and value-judgements, and therefore creating cohesive interpreted meanings, psychologically speaking, out of the contents of our experience. The pervasiveness and habituation of moral thinking, acting and evaluating [Dawn 9] is itself conditioned by existential and therefore superstitious fears - “fear of a higher intellect that commands through tradition, fear in the face of an inexplicable, indeterminate power, of something beyond the personal- there is superstition in this fear.” That is, the human fear of the essentially unknowable and therefore unconquerable aspects of becoming-as-such condition a flight to meaning based on established traditions, and propels the desire to turn oneself into a function, and creates the ascetic ideal, all of which becomes habitualized in thought and therefore renders life manageable and ordinary. However, these moral valuations “crowd out the significance of the smallest, everyday, matters [GS299]”xiv; things pertaining to lifestyle, diet and so on; in addition, adopted meanings organize life in a way over which the agent has little conscious control. Hence, for Nietzsche, self-critical observation and science plays a key role in allowing the free spirit to shape the terms by which he lives a purposive life.

The triumph of the will to truth and 'physics'

The above section opens up several ways in which Nietzsche might have thought that the “intellectual conscience” and the development of scientific methods of inquiry, as well as scientific understanding of the self and the world contribute to the project of creation of ideals and self-creation.

First, the products of scientific development, broadly understood, allows us to better manage the natural and social conditions which affect our lives, through technology, social science, policy and management practices and so on.

Second, in exhorting us to become “the best learners and discovers of everything that is lawful and necessary in the world”, that is, of ourselves, he advises us to know ourselves in order to create personal virtues. This can be neatly, if crudely, explained in the chart below:

The 'Herd'

Control (Experience of free will)
↓
Meaning (Metaphysics)
↓
Function (Morality)

The 'Free-Spirit'

Control (Amor Fati, Individual virtues)
↑
Meaning (Self-knowledge from psychology, sciences)
↑
Function (Honesty, will to truth, self-experimentation scientific method)

Hence Nietzsche interprets the freedom from the possibility of a metaphysical solution to the problem of becoming-as-such as an opportunity to overcome the pessimist view of life as suffering, or as a question mark, thereby paving the way for a physics that allows us to embrace and affirm life, and to “live in the present”.

i Nietzsche, Friedrich (1887), trans. Kaufmann. The Gay Science, Random House, 335, p.265
ii Ibid, p.265
iii Nietzsche, Friedrich (1887), trans. Kaufmann. The Gay Science, Random House, 21, p.94
iv Thanks to my lecturer
v Nietzsche, Friedrich (1887), trans. Kaufmann. The Gay Science, Random House, 335, p.265
vi Nietzsche, Friedrich (1880), trans. Hollingdale. Human, All Too Human: Assorted Opinions and Maxims, Cambridge University Press, 5, p.215
vii Guay, Robert (2005): How to be an Immoralist, in Nietzsche and Ethics, Peter Lang, p. 59
viii Ibid, p.59
ix Ibid, p.59
x Ibid, p.59
xi Ibid, p.60
xii Ibid, p.61
xiii Nietzsche, Friedrich (1887), trans. Kaufmann. The Gay Science, Random House, 335, p.265
xiv Guay, Robert (2005): How to be an Immoralist, in Nietzsche and Ethics, Peter Lang, p. 78